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The purpose of  this thesis  is  to evaluate social policy 
toward higher education in the United States.     Given  the present 
economic  circumstances,   the  thesis also suggests alternatives  to 
current policy. 
The pursuit  of educational  training constitutes an investment 
in human  resources which is  of great  importance to the economic and 
social well-being of  the nation.     Recognizing this fact,   this paper 
analyzes  the conditions which presently surround the decision to 
invest  in higher education.     The perspectives of both  the student  and 
society are considered.     The analysis strongly suggests that the 
present  levels  of public support for higher education are excessive 
vis a vis  the benefits which society realizes from its  investment. 
Present  labor market  conditions are consistent with the view that 
the social  investment  in higher educational programs could be reduced 
by eliminating surplus educational output capacity and by shifting 
emphasis  to  less expensive programs with greater occupational emphasis. 
Implementation of  such policy would bring about lower social costs 
to higher education with little or no loss in social benefits. 
t 
SOCIAL POLICY TOWARD 
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
by 
John G. Redmond 
A Thesis Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
Greensboro 
1975 
Approved by 
APPROVAL  PAGE 
This   thesis has been approved by the following committee of  the 
Faculty of the Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
Thesis Adviser 
Thesis Committee Members 
^ytmj£-^*r -ferL^**ttvj 
■*** 
_XiJ3SsiSt 
i£to u< 
Datff of Acceptance 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
For their assistance in the preparation of this thesis,   I would 
like to express my sincere appreciation to my thesis  committee, 
Dr.   John P.   Formby,   Dr.   Jeffrey Harrison,   and Dr.   Gary Barnes. 
As well,   Miss Lynn Waller deserves a special note of  thanks for her 
diligent  and patient help. 
iii 
TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST  OF TABLES v 
Chapter 
I.      INTRODUCTION          1 
II.      INVESTMENT  IN  HIGHER EDUCATION: 
A MODEL FOR SOCIETY AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL        7 
III.      PREVAILING  SOCIAL  POLICY: 
THE  CARNEGIE  COMMISSION  ON HIGHER EDUCATION     37 
IV.     PREVAILING SOCIAL POLICY: 
THE NATIONAL  BOARD  ON  GRADUATE  EDUCATION     53 
V.      SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 73 
iv 
485037 
LIST  OF TABLES 
Table Page 
I.     Relative Distribution of Employed Persons by Major 
Occupational Group,   1900 to 1970        9 
II.     Numbers  of  Bachelor's and First Professional Degrees, 
Masters and Second Professional Degrees, 
and Ph.D.   or Equivalent Degrees Granted by 
United States   Institutions,   1870-1970         10 
III.     Estimated Annual Education Cost  per Student by 
Level and Control of Institution,   Sex of 
Student and Bearer of Costs for 1970-71 20 
IV.     Annual Annuity Return Necessary for Higher 
Educational Costs by Type and Control 
of Institution,   Sex of Student 22 
V.     Annual Annuity Return Necessary for Four Years 
of College Attendance by Type and Control 
of  Institution and Sex of  Investor 25 
VI.     Necessary Annuity Returns  for Total Expenditures 
on Higher Education          29 
VII.     Necessary Annual Returns for Total Expenditures on 
Elementary and Secondary Education in United 
States 32 
VIII.     Relationship  of Total Educational Annuity Returns 
to Changes  in National Income         43 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
Alfred Marshall once wrote,   "The most valuable of all capital 
is  that invested in human beings."       Since Marshall's  time,   social 
scientists have devoted considerable effort to analyzing the nature of 
investments  in man. 
Primary among the investments  in human resources  is education. 
In the United States,   the belief  in the benefits of education has been 
such that school attendance is  legally required.     Over the past half 
century,   the  trend  to educate has continued to be strong as the 
educational attainment of the population has  grown along with the 
economy.     By the 1950's  and  1960's,   the possession of post-secondary 
educational training had become a prime characteristic of the upwardly 
mobile in  the American work force.     Expansion of  college programs had 
proceeded at a rapid pace.     However,   some recent forecasts  indicate that 
the limits  to the college education trend have been reached. 
For example,   the United States Department of Labor has estimated 
that in the decade of  the 1970's there will be 9.6 million new college 
educated workers entering the labor force.    Approximately 3.7 million 
are expected to be needed as replacements for those leaving the labor 
force.     Another  3.3 million will be absorbed in expanded job opportunities. 
But 2.6 million or 27% will become employed in   'educationally upgraded' 
jobs;   these are jobs which have been filled by lesser educated people 
in the past.2    Another forecast by the United States Bureau of  the 
Census  indicates  that   the number of college  graduates in 1975 will 
be  in excess of  job market requirements by approximately 3.3 million 
persons. 
Now in 1975,   the presence of an economic recession makes  the 
employment  situation difficult to assess.     But as  the Wall Street 
Journal and other sources have noted,   a college degree is not the 
guarantee of job  security and better opportunities  that it was in 
the recent past.     The Journal  estimates  that 58% of  the college class 
of  1975 will get  degrees  in areas where the supply of graduates 
exceeds market  demand.       To the extent that college  trained people 
must accept jobs which do not utilize their superior  skills and 
talents,   then these human resources  are wasted.     The primary purpose 
of this paper is  to examine the present situation concerning investments 
in college  training.     This will be  accomplished by analyzing the 
benefits of higher education relative  to its  costs.     An attempt will 
be made to determine whether the present United States  commitment 
to college education is  economically justified.     Public policy toward 
higher education is reviewed in the  light of  the new job market 
conditions.     Finally,  alternative policies are suggested. 
As a point of  reference,  Gary Becker describes   investments  in 
human capital as   'activities  that  influence  future monetary and 
psychic income by increasing the  resources  in people.'       Becker's 
concept of human capital is quite broad and perhaps appropriately so. 
When economists  consider investments   in physical  capital,  they are 
primarily concerned with  the market  effects of   the investment;   that  is, 
the  costs versus returns expressed in monetary terms.     In considering 
human capital,  however,   other aspects of investments must also be  taken 
into  account.     Hence,  Becker acknowledges the   'psychic income'   in 
addition to the   'monetary  income' which are returns from investments 
in people.     So we may expect that people will derive non-market types 
of satisfaction  from education which is  in addition to  their increased 
earnings.     A brief discussion of the significance of  these non-market 
aspects  of human capital investments is  in order. 
Individuals pay tuition and fees  for college attendance and 
forego  the earnings which  they might earn were  they not in school. 
Presumably,   these  costs are  incurred with  the expectation that  the 
education will provide some  offsetting benefits  in the future.     Higher 
income and a better job are  the returns to education which are most 
often  considered,  but  a host of  other benefits are also available to 
individuals  from their education.     In contrast  to  the benefits  in 
income,   this   latter group is  not easily quantified in monetary  terms. 
Status   from an educational degree,   relation to an institution, 
broadened cultural awareness,  personal contacts,   and the positive 
aspects  of  the  college experience itself  all serve to augment the 
income benefits which education provides.     Hansen and Weisbrod call 
this latter group   'consumption benefits.'6    This  term suggests 
that these benefits are personal in nature.     The non-market benefits 
augment   the superior earnings which the educated receive.     Therefore, 
the personal satisfaction gained from education renders  this investment 
in human capital  a better investment for individuals  than it would 
be in the  absence of such benefits. 
It is  important  to note that students do not bear all    of  the 
costs  of college education.     Either a government authority or 
voluntary contributors  subsidize higher education. 
The economic rationale  for subsidizing higher education is to be 
found  in  the notion  that the public gains  a return as an external social 
benefit  from the education of  individuals.     Hansen and Weisbrod 
allege these external social benefits  to be of  four types.       The 
first  public benefit  is  found in the contribution which higher education 
makes   toward an  informed electorate.     Secondly,   the provision of 
higher education contributes  to the equality of opportunity for students 
from lower income families.     Thirdly,   the encouragement of higher 
education may promote employment and  therefore reduce the public's 
transfer payment burden.     Finally,   society may benefit from education 
to the extent  that this  training leads  to  the advancement and 
application of knowledge. 
The  abstract nature of public benefits to higher education makes 
the public sector's  task of determining an appropriate level of subsidy 
a difficult job.     Proving the existence of  these external social 
benefits much less quantifying them cannot be done in any manner that 
is not open to considerable question.     Indeed,   some economists have 
denied  their existence  altogether.     However,   the public has continued 
its support for higher education in the belief   (correct or not) 
that so subsidizing education was  in its own interest.     The economists 
traditional faith in the sovereignty of the consumers'   awareness of 
his own preferences,   therefore,  strongly suggests  that a set of 
external social benefits  to higher education exists.     Taxpayers have 
believed in  these social benefits  and have,   therefore,   supported 
higher education probably as vigorously as any other social good 
other  than national defense.     Economic growth,   the dissemination 
of  cultural influences,   and  the provision of general types of 
training which employers  cannot rationally provide are briefly 
offered here as other incidences of potential social benefits.     We 
recognize the  less  than concrete nature of  these external social 
benefits  and we  acknowledge  that  their existence cannot be proven 
unequivocally.     But based on  the argument of consumer sovereignty, 
the position of  this paper is  that the burden to disprove the existence 
of external social benefits yet falls on the disclaimers. 
In the absence of evidence  to  the contrary, we explicitly 
assume  that  there are significant external social benefits flowing from 
investment  in higher education.     One of  the primary objectives of 
this paper will be  to evaluate the  changes  in social benefits  and 
costs  to higher education which have been brought about by new conditions 
in the labor market. 
Chapter  II below is a quantitative evaluation of investment 
decision for higher education.     Comparison of costs and benefits is 
made  for both the  individual student and society as a whole.     Since 
the decision criteria are so different and since different motives are 
involved,   the private and public decisions must be considered 
separately.     Generally,   the analysis of Chapter II  indicates  that as 
late as  1971,   the private decision to  invest  in college  for individuals 
is well justified. 
Chapter  III is  a review and critique of  the 1973 Carnegie 
Commission Report,   College Graduates  and Jobs:    Adjusting to a New 
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Labor Market Situation.       The Carnegie Report is an example of one 
of  the most prestigious  sources of information and opinion on higher 
education.     This paper evaluates  the Commission's recommendations for 
higher educational policy based on widely recognized reports and 
forecasts  for recent job market conditions. 
Chapter  IV reviews  the National Board of Graduate Education's 
Doctorate Manpower Forecasts and Policy. This  report is another 
set  of educational policy recommendations similar to the Carnegie 
Commission Report, but is more specifically directed toward graduate 
degree  training.     The position taken by  the National Board of Graduate 
Education is of particular interest because   the Board is  critical 
of the present levels of public support   for graduate training.     Chapter 
IV concludes with an outlook on educational trends.     Chapter V 
summarizes  the substantive conclusions  of the paper. 
II.      INVESTMENT  IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
A  MODEL FOR  SOCIETY AND THE  INDIVIDUAL 
In economic  literature,   it is  common to see a distinction made 
between economic growth which  is usually taken to mean simply an 
increase in economic product  and economic development which involves 
internal realignment of  an economy accompanying economic growth.     The 
former term is usually associated with  the advancement of a more 
mature economy while the latter seems to better characterize the 
alterations  in economic structure which the less developed countries 
must undergo if  they are to emulate the progress of  their richer 
neighbors.     While the exact use of these terms  is not critical,   it 
is noteworthy  that even the highly developed countries  including the 
United States have experienced a considerable amount  of development 
and structural  change in addition to sheer growth in the relatively 
recent past.     The evaluation of  the growth and development  processes 
of different economies may be viewed as varying only in degree and 
not altogether in kind. 
As an example,   in the 1900's the United States per capita 
gross national product measured in terms of constant  1958 dollars 
was $942.     This figure is a mere fraction of the 1970 value  of $3524. 
While these figures give some indication of  the magnitude of economic 
growth which occurred in the United States,   they indicate little 
about  the accompanying economic development.     Concealed in the raw 
measure of growth are  the progression of technology and innovation, 
the realization of economies of scale, the exploitation of abundant 
natural resources, the utilization of more and better labor and the 
changes in social and cultural attitudes.  One indicator of the over- 
all change in the structure of the economy is the changing occupational 
distribution of the work force.  Table I shows this information for 
very broad occupational groups in 1900 and 1970. 
The striking features of Table I are quite unmistakable.  In 
relative terms, employment in farming has declined greatly and white 
collar occupations have shown a marked relative increase.  These two 
facts alone suggest that a considerable amount of human capital in 
the form of education and other training has been injected into the 
economic process.  The movement of employment from farming to more 
formal skill demanding jobs could not have occurred without extensive 
investments in human capital.  Realizing that the general level of 
technology present in 1970 is vastly more complex than it was in 1900, 
one must conclude further that even the relatively stable proportions 
of blue collar and service workers require more formal skills than 
they did in the past. 
Though Table I may be suggestive of the role of education 
in the advancement of the economy, it indicates nothing about the 
actual magnitude of the human capital stocks developed over this 
period.  Table II below shows how the output of higher educational 
degrees has increased since 1870.  The number of Bachelor's and 
first professional degrees granted in 1970 is seventeen times 
greater than the number for 1920.  To put this fact in proper 
TABLE  I 
RELATIVE  DISTRIBUTION OF  EMPLOYED  PERSONS 
BY  MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL  GROUP 
1900 to 1970 
(In Percent) 
I                  II 
1900             1970 
White Collar 18                 48 
Blue Collar 35                  35 
Service Workers 9                  13 
Farm Workers 38                    4 
Sources:     Historical Statistics of  the 
United States,   Colonial Times 
to  1957,   p. 74;   and Statistical 
Abstract of 
p.   230. 
the United States, 
TABLE  II 
NUMBERS  OF BACHELOR'S  AND  FIRST PROFESSIONAL  DEGREES, 
MASTERS  AND  SECOND  PROFESSIONAL DEGREES, 
AND  PH.D.   OR EQUIVALENT  DEGREES 
GRANTED  B¥  UNITED  STATES   INSTITUTIONS 
1870 - 1970 
10 
Bachelor &  1st Masters  &  2nd Ph.D.   & 
Professional Professional Equivalent 
1870 9,371 1 
1880 12,896 879 54 
1890 15,539 1,015 149 
1900 27,410 1,583 382 
1910 37,199 2,113 443 
1920 48,622 4,279 615 
1930 122,484 14,969 2,299 
1940 186,500 26,731 2,390 
1950 432,058 58,183 6,633 
1960 394,889 74,497 9,829 
1970 827,234 208,291 29,866 
1971 877,676 .      230,509 32,107 
1972* 921,000 237,600 33,400 
1973* 991,200 251,400 34,400 
Sources:  Historical Statistics of the United States and 
Supplement, p. 327-338; and Projections of 
Educational Statistics to 1982, p. 46. 
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perspective,   the United States  population in 1970 was not quite 
double what  it had been in 1920.     Obviously,   the period 1920-1970 
shows  a trend toward an increase in the educational level of  the 
American labor force.     In current dollars,   the  total expenditures of 
United States institutions of higher education was just under 30 
billion dollars  in 1971-72.     This figure is over three  times  greater 
than the $8.5 billion spent for  the same purpose just ten years before. 
Values  of plant and physical plant funds of United States colleges 
and universities were over  $34 billion in 1968.12    Thus,   from the 
standpoint  of absolute size, wealth,   output,  or growth,   the higher 
education industry has expanded greatly. 
Having  touched upon  the magnitude and significance of the 
United States'   system of higher education,   it is  appropriate to more 
thoroughly examine  the economic setting in which the higher education 
industry operates.     One possible perspective is  that of the individual 
investor in higher education.    This approach is advantageous  in that 
the familiar assumptions  and  tools of microeconomic analysis may 
be meaningfully employed.     Individuals will attempt  to maximize their 
utility and in so doing,   they will  invest  to a point where discounted 
expectations of net returns  from investment fall to zero.     These 
and other common principles of microeconomics make analysis of the 
individual's perspective relatively clear cut.     Using this  framework, 
Becker and others have found  that  the rate of return of investment 
in a college education is approximately equal,  on the average,   to the 
13 
mean rate of return on investments  in physical capital. 
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As another means of evaluation,   one may employ the perspective 
of the social system as  a whole.     Society has an interest in the amount 
and quality of  training which its members receive.     Since a macro- 
economic approach is  in principle capable of dealing with the 
multiplicity of  cost bearers and benefit gainers which characterize 
the educational process,   this  is the preferred means for policy 
evaluation.     Simultaneously,   though,   a difficulty arises at the 
aggregate level because of  the absence of  a single set of policy 
objectives which educators,   government policy makers,  students,  and 
taxpayers would recognize or agree upon. 
This paper will consider the decision to invest in higher 
education from the points of view of the individual and from society 
as a whole.     Equity and policy prescriptions other than those 
resting upon the most basic and highly defensible cost benefit 
foundation will be avoided. 
Before proceeding into an analysis of higher education,   a brief 
examination of  the nature of education is  in order.    This discussion 
will foreshadow the view on higher education held in this paper 
and will also provide some clarification of  terms which may be 
unfamiliar in the present context. 
Education at  any level is  to be thought of as primarily an 
investment  good rather than a consumption good.     The greatest part of 
the benefits which arise from education come as a stream of benefits 
over time rather than as a lump of consumptive utility to the student 
(buyer)   at  the time of acquisition  (purchase). 
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Another peculiarity of education involves  the nature of  the 
buyers  themselves.     In the United States,  higher education ordinarily 
bears positive costs  to the student.     The student will rationally 
incur these  costs of higher education according to the benefits which 
the education is  expected to provide him.     He is probably not concerned 
with the benefits others may realize from his  education. 
In the United States,   students  (and their families)  almost 
never bear all the costs of  college education.     Typically,  either 
some government agency,   private interest,   or both will contribute to 
the support of colleges and this subsidy  translates  into lower tuition 
charges   (prices)   for students.     Presumably,   the non-student contributors 
to higher education believe  that there are some external benefits 
to a student's   training.     Contributors'   and government's support 
of higher education is based upon socially perceived external social 
benefits.     These social benefits accrue to society  through time. 
Hence,  public subsidies  like private expenditures are to be viewed as 
an investment decision. 
Investments  are made with the expectation of  an adequate 
return.     The public sector subsidizes   (invests  in)   higher education 
until   'enough'   students are produced  to satisfy society's need for 
the social benefits  to the education.     Ordinarily public subsidies 
of higher education serve to offset some private costs to this education. 
The greater  the subsidy the lower the private costs and the more 
profitable  the private investment in higher education.    The law of 
demand assures   the public that  lower  costs will induce more students 
to obtain college training.     The law of diminishing returns assures 
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that  there is  some economical limit  to the amount of college subsidy 
and the consequent  college trained individuals which the public will 
knowingly afford.     As  long as  the declining marginal social benefits 
to higher education are in excess of   the publically borne marginal 
costs to higher education,   the public will rationally subsidize  this 
training.     However, when the marginal social benefit falls below 
marginal social costs rational policy requires that  investment be 
diminished  (that  the subsidy be reduced).     Individual students,   of 
course,   are only concerned with their private benefits versus 
their privately borne costs and not whether society is wisely 
investing in education. 
For many reasons,   it seems  that there are non-pecuniary or 
non-market  aspects of both the benefits and costs associated with  the 
acquisition of  higher education.     Unless we can account for  these as 
well as  the ordinary market costs and benefits,   there is no sure way 
to determine the real nature of an investment decision for post 
secondary education.     In basic microeconomic theory,   excess profits of 
a particular type of business enterprise will induce others  to enter 
the industry until competition and output are such that no economic 
profits exist.     A similar  type of thinking might be postulated for 
the decision to enter into  the industry-like category of providing 
highly developed skills  to a labor market.     Thus,   in its common form, 
a potential for a superior income level which comes as  the result of 
gaining a higher education degree will induce investment  in higher 
education until such time  that the discounted expected stream of net 
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earnings   falls  to a level which makes  the Investor Indifferent 
to more investment. 
Along  these same lines of  thought,   some economists consider it 
convenient  if not necessary to assume  that  labor is paid its marginal 
product.     One economist,  Lester Thurow,   goes  so far as  to say that the 
concept of human capital  .   .   .   "ceases  to have  any economic meaning.   .   ." 
if wages  do not equal  labor's marginal product. But there is  consider- 
able reason to believe that  labor is in fact not paid its marginal 
product and further,   that  there may be some obvious  reasons why this 
is so.     Certainly,   restrictions  to labor's mobility and the existence 
of imperfect knowledge limit  the neatness of  the competitive model's 
usual solution as well as the degree of the model's applicability 
to practical evaluations of human capital and wage analysis.     But 
another deterrent to  the competive model's employment solution exists 
in the social conditions which affect workers preferences  for certain 
types of jobs.     If Thurow is  correctly describing the real  labor market, 
then he must have been implicitly assuming that wage earners also 
consider non-pecuniary gains  and costs  to education. 
As one example,   it seems reasonable to assume that a secretary 
has more of an initial investment in her market skills than does a 
relatively unskilled female production line worker.     Yet the latter 
is often the recipient of higher wages and the former foregoes  the 
further benefit of on-the-job   training for the sake of a socially 
preferable position.     In the extreme case,   one  finds upper-middle 
class married women doing work for which they receive no monetary 
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compensation such as  in volunteer hospital work.    The non-pecuniary 
gains in having an occupation,  maintaining social status,   flexible 
conditions,  and perhaps in exercising charitable motives  serve to 
outweigh some or all of the pecuniary gains in wages which are most 
often thought  of as  the primary determinant of occupational decisions. 
So perhaps  it  is  that   the form of the competitive model's wage and 
human capital investment solutions require the equalizations of  the 
sums  of pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains with the sums of pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary costs. 
Utilizing this approach,   the non-market gains  to a type of 
employment  can be thought of as a kind of economic rent accruing  to 
the employer in that they represent a money saving in his  labor 
expenses.     It  should be recognized also that the motive to attend 
college may not be solely for a salary advantage but also for  the 
purpose of qualifying one for a particular social status associated 
with an occupation.     Further,   the social status of an occupation is 
not necessarily related  to the earnings of  that occupation.     A further 
implication of  this is  that the social forces that determine  the non- 
market aspects  of returns  to workers contribute to the structure of 
the economy and to the composition of its output.     The competitive 
model ordinarily  ignores  this impact. 
It would be difficult to predict the precise effects of a 
sudden  change  in these social preferences, but it seems  reasonable 
to expect some alteration in both wages and employment  for many 
types of work.     This  does not mean that it would be impossible to 
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conceptually  identify  the optimal aggregate quantity of investment 
in higher education.     Rather,   it merely suggests that individual 
preferences  of sellers  of labor's services should be accounted for 
in a fashion analogous   to terms which recognize the effects which 
consumer preferences have on demand schedules.     Individual preferences 
are similarly as important  in the determination of the supply 
schedule for labor as such schedules  relate to specific job  categories. 
The discussion above of  the real market versus  theoretical 
market conditions  of employment and investment  is  intended to establish 
a background against which the effectiveness of social policy as it 
relates  to the national and individual propensity to invest in 
higher education can be evaluated.     As noted in Chapter I,   the 
situation facing those who are now investing in higher education can 
be simplified to terms which amount to saying that they will face 
increased competition for jobs in categories which were plagued with 
shortages  in the recent past.     As  a result,   significant underemployment 
can be expected and average returns to education will decline.     But 
whether graduates will find jobs which are appropriate to their training 
is,   of course,  only a part of  the question to be answered in determining 
whether such occupational  superfluity of  skills  is economically 
defensible.     Regardless of what one does as a vocation,   it is often 
the case that he or she as an individual will benefit from whatever 
education has been received.     More education without consideration of 
costs   is probably always preferable  to less education simply because of 
the consumption benefits which accrue to those in possession of  the 
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training.     What is  of  considerable importance,  however,   is the question 
of whether rates of  subsidy as borne by the public are such that 
they are in excess of what the public could spend and obtain the same 
or at  least an adequate return in terms  of social benefits  to higher 
education. 
It is an explicitly stated assumption of this paper that social 
benefits to higher education do exist and that they are transmitted 
to society primarily  through the student's participation in the labor 
market   in a job which utilizes his  training.     This  is  to say that 
generally society will fail to realize the greatest part of  the 
external social benefit of a student's education if  the student 
becomes  underemployed. 
If  the rate of subsidy to higher education is  excessive,   then 
the public as  a whole is  in effect subsidizing some  of   the personal 
consumption activities of  those groups who partake  of higher education 
and not receiving a social return as  compensation.     In other words, 
if the marginal benefits  to society and to the economy are exceeded 
by the marginal costs  of subsidizing higher education at present levels 
of  output,   then a realignment of public support for such education is 
in order.     This amounts  to nothing more than saying  that the costs of 
an activity should be allocated in line with the benefits which come 
from that activity. 
THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  PERSPECTIVE: 
The remainder of  this  chapter concentrates on the circumstances 
surrounding private investment in education to the Bachelor's degree 
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level.     Even with the levels of underemployment forecast,   one can 
see that at  the microeconomic level there are still adequate inducements 
to invest in education for individuals given the very recent experience 
of wage  rates vis a vis educational attainment.     Table III below 
shows estimates of selected average college costs  for the year 
1970-71.     The data are broken down for different types of 
institutions.     Because of the microeconomic perspective,   the costs of 
board and dormitory charges  to individual students are not  included 
in this  table.     Room and board are merely substitutes  for services 
which students would require in or out  of school so in an opportunity 
cost sense the costs of these services  can be ignored. 
One of  the most  important costs of college attendance  is  the 
foregone earnings of   the student.     Since college students are generally 
high school graduates,   the most  intuitively appealing income  opportunity 
cost of college attendance is the average earnings  of similarly aged 
high school graduates.     The Department of Health,   Education,   and 
Welfare estimated this mean opportunity income for 18-24 year old men 
with four years of high school at $4195  in 1971.     The comparable 
figure  for women was $2816.15    Column 1 of Table  III  lists the total 
educational costs by level and control of  the institution and by the 
sex of the investor.     These figures in Column I include foregone in- 
come.     Column II of Table III lists  the sums of foregone  income and 
the average student borne charges  for the various   institutions.     Column 
III  then is  the residual estimate of the per student higher educational 
costs borne by parties other than the student and his immediate 
supporters such as his family.     These figures in Column III include 
TABLE  III 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL EDUCATION COST PER STUDENT 
BY LEVEL AND  CONTROL  OF  INSTITUTION, 
SEX OF STUDENT AND BEARER OF COSTS 
For 1970-71 
(In Dollars) 
Column I 
Total Current Funds 
Expended.Per Student 
Including Foregone 
Income for Education 
Column II 
Student Borne 
Costs, Tuition and 
Fees 
Column III 
Residual 
Costs Borne 
By 'Other' 
Sources 
Men Women Men Women Men and Women 
Public Institutions 
University 
Other 4 year 
2 year 
7227 
5955 
5156 
5848 
4577 
3785 
4673 
4526 
4381 
3294 
3148 
3002 
2554 
1429 
783 
Private Institutions 
University 
Other 4 year 
2 year 
8847 
6291 
5758 
7468 
4912 
4379 
6176 
5799 
5305 
4797 
4420 
3926 
2671 
492 
453 
Sources:     Financial Statistics  of Institutions of Higher Education,  1973.     U.S.   Department 
of Health,  Education,  and Welafre, Table C.    Charges to Students,  Projections of 
Educational Statistics  to 1928-83, U.S.   Department of Health, Education,  and Welfare, 
pp.   109-110.     Consumer Income,  Current Population Reports Series P.   60, No.   85, 
December,   1972.     U.S.   Department of Commerce. 
o 
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public support to education from governmental agencies and gifts 
from private sources.     This paper will generally refer to this 
column as public or  'other'   support to higher education. 
The nature of higher education is such that the information 
in Tahle III  is not very significant  in itself.     Since expenditures 
for education are made with the expectation of a stream of benefits 
accruing to the investor over some time period,   the per year costs 
of Table III are only half of  the story since they do not indicate 
anything about  the  returns on investments which higher education 
provides.     But the returns and the costs must be considered in evaluating 
decisions on higher education. 
This paper utilizes a simple model to approximate the stream 
of benefits to  college education.    We will assume that the returns 
which students  realize from education are equal in all time periods 
over the period  that  the investment produces  returns.     Since 
imperfect knowledge so strongly characterizes  the decision to invest 
in human capital one may as well choose a simple and manageable 
model to represent the investment decision as  to choose a more complex 
one and have no  greater assurance of accuracy. 
If all periodic returns  to an investment are equal,   this stream 
of benefits can be treated as if it were an annuity.     Thus,  Table IV 
takes  the cost of higher education figures  in Table III as  the present 
value of  the annuity and shows  the annual return on this present 
value as  if  the annuity runs for forty years.     In this way,   the 
figures demonstrate the minimum benefits which are necessary to 
TABLE IV 
ANNUAL ANNUITY RETURN NECESSARY FOR HIGHER EDUCATIONAL COSTS 
BY TYPE AND CONTROL OF INSTITUTION, SEX OF STUDENT 
40 Year Annuity at 8% and 10% 
Public Institutions 
University:  8% 
10% 
Other 4 year:  8% 
10% 
2 year:  8% 
10% 
Private Institutions 
University:  8% 
10% 
Other 4 year:  8% 
10% 
2 year:  8% 
10% 
Column I Column II Column III 
Total of Current Student Borne Expenses Borne 
Funds Expended ( 3osts By 'Others' 
Men Women Men Women Men and Women 
606 490 392 276 214 
739 598 478 337 261 
499 384 379 264 120 
609 478 462 322 146 
433 317 367 252 66 
528 387 448 307 80 
742 626 518 402 224 
905 763 632 490 273 
528 412 486 371 41 
643 502 593 452 50 
483 367 445 329 38 
589 448 542 401 46 
Source:  Computed from Table III. 
i 
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compensate   the various  investors  for their costs of higher education. 
As such,   these annual annuity returns are necessary returns or an 
internal debt so  to speak which individual investors  in higher education 
incur.     A forty-year payoff period is  chosen because most college 
graduates  are in their early twenties,  and therefore,  can expect about 
forty years  of working life.     This is not  to say that benefits  to 
higher education,   public or private,   necessarily only accrue during 
years  of employment.     Rather,   the exclusion of non-working life 
benefits  is  seen as  another simplifying assumption. 
Table IV shows necessary annual returns computed on two 
alternative  interest rates,   8% and 10%.     These interest rates  serve 
to show the  opportunity costs  to  investment  in education and two 
rates are used  to show the difference in the magnitude of  the necessary 
annual returns  depending on the interest rate chosen.     For  instance, 
the annual annuity returns necessary to compensate a former  student 
figures at 10% are a rather large  one-fifth greater than the return 
figured on an 8% annuity.     Indeed,   the use of an annuity is  itself 
open to question.     But such a technique does provide at least an 
idea of what goes on in real market investments  in higher education. 
Table IV implies  that for each year of attendance,   a male 
student at a publically supported institution must realize $392 
(or  $478 depending on the opportunity rate of interest)   in benefits 
every year for forty years to compensate himself for his costs of 
that  investment.     A male student at  the more expensive private 
institutions  incurs an internal debt  running forty years of $518 
<or $632)  worth of benefits for each year of attendance. 
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In 1971,   for example,   for men 25 years old and older the 
differences  in mean earnings  for  those with four years of  college 
versus  those with four years of high school was  $4592.     For women 
in the same age category,   the salary difference was  $1963.16    For 
both men and women,   then,   the salary differentials are quite sufficient 
to justify the personally borne expenses  of  college education when 
viewed in this  annuity fashion.     The annual return at 10% for the 
most  expensive institutions,   the private university, when multiplied 
by four is  in no case greater than the salary difference as shown in 
Table V.     But as Denison,  Becker,   and others have noted,  not all 
the differences  in salary are attributable to education since those 
pursuing higher education are generally more talented individuals 
than those who stop at high school. According to Denison,  the 
proportion of   increased earnings which may be accounted for by 
ability is   two-fifths or 40%.     Sixty percent of the salary difference 
is  thus attributed to education. 
As Table V shows,   the investment  in four years of college is 
still justifiable in terms of  income alone for men as none of  the 
annuity returns  for four years of investment exceed even the income 
differential adjusted for differences  in ability of college students. 
For women,   though,   the situation is not so clear cut.     It would 
appear that women can only justify investing in four-year college 
educations  on the basis of salary alone by attending public institutions 
and if  the opportunity rate  is 8%.     Otherwise,  women's  income experience 
as of  1971 does not show that  the difference in mean incomes of 
those women with  four years of college is sufficient  to justify the 
25 
TABLE  V 
ANNUAL  ANNUITY  RETURN  NECESSARY  FOR 
FOUR YEARS  OF  COLLEGE  ATTENDANCE 
BY  TYPE AND  CONTROL  OF  INSTITUTION  AND  SEX OF  INVESTOR 
(In Dollars) 
Public Institutions 
University 
Other 4 year 
Private Institutions 
University 
Other 4 year 
Men 
8% 10% 
1568 1912 
1516 1848 
2072 2528 
1944 2372 
Women 
8% .    10% 
1104   1348 
1056   1288 
1608   1960 
1484   1080 
Source:  Table IV, Column II. 
MEAN SALARY DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN THOSE WITH FOUR YEARS OF COLLEGE AND 
THOSE WITH FOUR YEARS OF HIGH SCHOOL 
FOR MEN AND WOMEN 25-34 YEARS OF AGE 
1971 
(In Dollars) 
Men:  4592 Women:  1963 
60% Adjustment for Ability Differential 
2755 1178 
Source:  Consumer Income, Current Population Reports Series 
P. 60, No. 85, pp. 112-115, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
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costs  themselves.     If  legislation and social movements aimed at 
reducing job  discrimination against women are successful,  however, 
this  investment situation may change. 
It must be noted at this point that consideration has only 
been made of. mean salary differences.     Certainly,  a whole host of 
non-pecuniary personal benefits accrue to those with superior educational 
experience.     These benefits then serve as an added inducement  to those 
whose  incomes are already sufficiently higher to compensate their 
educational investment debts.     For  those groups whose income 
differential did not exceed  the cumulated annual return-debts other 
personal benefits serve as  a compensation over time. 
The consideration of non-pecuniary benefits can be made in 
another way.     For example,   given the real nature of the experience 
of  college attendance,   it would seem likely that  the private costs of 
attendance figures in Column II of Table III and  the necessary return 
figures   in Table IV are biased upward and possibly severely so when 
some other non-pecuniary aspects of  investment in higher education 
are considered.     Cultural experiences,  broadened awareness,   personal 
contacts,   relation  to educational institution,     prestige,   and so 
on,   all supplement  the increased earnings which a college education 
usually brings over one's  lifetime.     What is not so obvious,   though, 
are   the benefits or negative costs realized by a student while in 
college.     In the United States where social aspects of attendance 
receive nearly as much attention as academics,   it can be safely 
entertained that  the total costs of attendance are to be lessened by 
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some significant positive benefits which arise from the consumption 
benefits of college attendance realized while in college.     If  one 
accepts  the line of reasoning so far developed,   then the 
financially calculable returns to education are quite sufficient 
to support the decision to invest  in higher education for individuals. 
Further,   in most instances in this analysis,   this  conclusion can be 
made even without considering the non-pecuniary benefits of college 
education which would appear to add even further impetus   to  the 
positive  investment  decision at the micro level. 
SOCIETY'S  PERSPECTIVE: 
Turning to the macroeconomic viewpoint,   the annuity technique 
so  far discussed  can be extended as a tool of analysis.     One condition 
of economic efficiency involves  the requirement  that economic entities 
bear costs  according to the benefits which they receive from a given 
activity.     As  discussed in Chapter  I,   the nature of  the benefits 
to education is an elusive concept,   particularly where social benefits 
are concerned.    We have assumed that these social benefits do exist  for 
the  reasons   stated in the  first  chapter.     Further, we may quantify 
these benefits  and compare them to social costs of higher education 
in a fashion similar to that for individuals.     For the sake of 
simplicity, we will take a portion of economic growth as  the benefit 
accruing to society and compare  this public benefit  to the publically 
borne costs  of investments in higher education.     This reasoning  is 
3 is tent with  the work of Denison and others 
18 
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If an educational investment annuity were founded on accurate 
data and assumptions,   and if  its accounting methods were entirely 
consistent with  those employed in some perfectly accurate set  of 
national income accounts,  one would expect  that there would be a 
total return figure measurable  in terms of economic growth which 
society expected as a return  from its educational expenditures.     In 
any one year,   the  component of national product accounted for by 
educational investments would be the accumulation of  the annual 
'debts'   in returns   to education for the period of  time that educational 
investments of the past are still producing returns.     In other words, 
in a forty year annuity scheme as has already been used here,  the 
proportion of product in 1972  accounted for by education can be 
computed by the formula: 
R1971 + R1970 + R1969 +•'*•+ R1932 
Proportion National Income 
National Income 1972 
In words,   this equation is  interpreted as  the proportion of national 
income accounted for by total investments  in education for the year 
1972 equals   the sums of the returns for all years which are still 
active   (1932-1971)   divided by national income in 1972. 
Table VI below gives these calculations  for higher education. 
Column 1 gives  the enrollment in institutions of higher education in the 
United States for every second year from 1930  through  1958.     The 
figures  for 1930 are assumed to be a good estimate for 1931 and so on. 
As with all the columns,  data are given annually from 1960 on,   since 
these years are  later subject  to some special calculations.     Column 2 
TABLE VI 
NECESSARY ANNUITY RETURNS FOR TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON HIGHER EDUCATION 
1930 - 1972 
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1930 1101 718 .8 .5 1.3 1.1 .11 ToT TU .11 
1932 1154 527 .6 .5 1.1 1.0 .09 .08 .11 .10 
1934 1055 567 .6 .5 1.1 1.0 .09 .08 .11 .10 
1936 1208 672 .8 .5 1.3 1.1 .11 .09 .13 .11 
1938 1351 689 .9 .6 1.5 1.3 .13 .11 .15 .13 
1940 1494 778 1.2 .7 1.9 1.6 .16 .13 .19 .16 
1942 1404 1144 1.6 .7 2.3 1.9 .19 .16 .24 .19 
1944 1155 1426 1.6 1.0 2.6 2.2 .22 .18 .27 .22 
1946 1677 1351 2.3 1.1 3.4 2.8 .29 .23 .35 .29 
1948 2616 1657 4.3 1.9 6.2 5.1 .52 .43 .63 .52 
1950 2659 1820 4.8 2.2 7.0 5.8 .59 .49 .72 .59 
1952 2302 2095 4.8 2.5 7.3 6.1 .61 .51 .75 .62 
1954 2200 2199 4.8 2.9 7.7 6.5 .65 .55 .79 .66 
1956 2637 2686 7.1 3.5 10.6 8.8 .89 .74 1.08 .90 
1958 2900 2655 7.7 4.5 12.2 10.3 1.02 .86 1.25 1.05 
1960 3216 2768 8.9 5.6 14.5 12.3 1.22 1.03 1.48 1.26 
1961 2861 2768 10.7 8.5 10.2 16.5 1.61 1.38 1.96 1.69 
1962 4175 2768 11.6 10.2 21.8 18.9 1.83 1.58 2.23 1.93 
1963 4495 3059 13.8 11.3 25.1 21.7 2.10 1.82 2.57 2.22 
1964 4950 2095 15.1 '   12.9 28.0 24.2 2.35 2.03 2.86 2.47 
1965 5526 3325 18.4 15.2 33.6 29.0 2.82 2.43 3.44 2.97 
1966 5928 3325 19.7 17.5 37.2 32.3 3.12 2.71 •3.80 3.30 
1967 6406 3674 23.5 19.9 43.4 37.5 3.64 3.14 4.44 3.83 
1968 6928 3674 25.5 22.1 47.6 41.2 3.99 3.46 4.87 4.21 
1969 7484 3674 27.5 24.7 52.2 45.3 4.38 3.80 5.34 4.63 
1970 7920 4172 33.0 27.4 60.4 52.2 5.07 4.38 6.18 5.34 
1971 8116 4172 33.9 29.9 63.8 55.3 5:35 4.64 6.52 5.65 
1972 8220 4172 34.3 32.5 66.8 58.2 5.60 4.88 6.83 5.95 
Sources :     Hlstor Leal Statis tics of the United 
1 Abstract of  the U 
t   and   Earnings,   p. 
States,  p. 
.8.,  p.   13 
xi; Consum 
213 and 
;   Projec 
Continuation Historical Statistics  to 
1962. 
and 92 
Statistlca 
;  Employmen 
tions of Educational Statistics,  p.   7 
jr Income , Table 49 
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in Table VI gives the opportunity income based on estimates of male 
high school graduates income.  Column 3 is the product of Columns 1 
and 2 giving the unadjusted amount of gross opportunity earnings in 
billions of dollars.  Column 4 is the current year's expenditures in 
billions of dollars for United States institutions of higher learning. 
Column 5 is the sum of Columns 3 and 4.  Column 6 is computed as 
Column 5 but with total foregone earning (Column 2) multiplied 
by .75 to adjust for several factors.  Among these are the negative 
influence of these figures in Column 2 accounted for by females having 
lower opportunity earnings than males.  Females are included in 
Column 1 enrollment figures, but are not heretofore accounted for in 
the male's high school income figures given in Column 2.  In 1965, 
as one example, females accounted for about 40% of total enrollment 
in institutions of higher learning.  This 25% reduction of the Column 3 
product also attempts to account for what income students earned 
while in college which would offset some of the full foregone earnings 
in Column 2.  These factors which would reduce the actual magnitude 
of the entires in total opportunity high school graduate's income, but 
their diminishing effects are offset by the fact that college students 
as a class are generally expected to possess more raw earning ability 
than those who stop their education at four years of high school.  Reducing 
total earnings by 25% is explicitly assumed to account for these factors 
within an acceptable tolerance. 
Returning to the equation above, the proportion of 1972 national 
income which society owes itself as an internal debt for past investments 
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in higher education according to Table VI is  two times  the sum of 
the semi-yearly annuity return figures  in Column 8  (8% annuity, 
Column 10 gives  10% annuity figures)  for 1932 through 1958 plus   the sum 
of  the yearly annuity return figures for 1960 through 1971,  all divided 
by national  income for 1972.    At  the 8% return rate,   about A 1/2% 
of national income of  1972  is accounted for as an accumulation of returns 
for forty years of  investment  in higher education.     Fo-r 10%,  similarly 
computed on Column 10  in Table VI,   the figure is about 5 1/2% of  1972 
national income.     Aside from comparing the relative magnitude of   these 
returns  attributable to education,   one may also note  that  these figures 
are rising as  the ratio of  annual spending on higher education rises 
relative  to national income. 
Edward Denison in his  landmark work, The Sources of Economic 
Growth,   suggests  that education of all types   (not just higher education) 
accounted for 23% of the growth of  total real national income of  the 
period 1929-1957.20    In this  same work, he forecast a 19% figure for 
the contribution of education to the growth rate for the period  of 
1960-1980.     In a later work,     Why Growth Rates Differ,   he amends   the 
prediction for the later period to 17%.21    Since Denison makes no 
distinction for the level of education involved, we may compare the 
results of  the annuity technique used  in this paper if we incorporate 
data and calculations for elementary and secondary educational 
investments   (Table VII)   and apply them in a manner similar to that of 
Table VI.     Keeping in mind Denison's   17% prediction for education's 
role in growth of national income and taking the annual returns of 
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TABLE VII 
NECESSARY ANNUAL RETURNS 
FOR TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
IN UNITED STATES 
1952 - 1972 
1 2 3 4 
Elementary 
and Secondary 
School Expenditures 8% Annuity 10% Annuity 
Year In Billion Dollars 4C years 40 years 
1961 20.8 1.74 2.13 
1962 22.2 1.86 2.27 
1963 24.3 2.04 2.48 
1964 26.7 2.24 2.73 
1965 29.7 2.49 3.04 
1966 31.9 2.68 3.26 
1967 37.0 3.10 3.78 
1968 39.6 3.32 4.05 
1969 45.0 3.77 4.60 
1970 49.2 4.13 5.03 
1971 53.6 4.49 5.48 
1972 57.4 4.81 5.87 
Source:     "Projections of Educational Statistics  to 1982-83." 
1973 edition,   p.   92-93. 
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Columns  2   (8%)   and 3  (10%)  In Table VII for elementary and secondary 
education and adding these to Columns  8 and 10 respectively in Table VI 
we  gain the Columns   1 and 4 in Table VIII.     Columns  2 and 5 in Table 
VIII are the averages of  the annual changes  in national incomes  for 
the current year,   the past year,   and the next year.     These are averaged 
to eliminate some of  the fluctuations in the results which would occur 
due  to business  cycles  and so on.     Columns 3 and 6 in Table VIII are 
the ratios  of  the sum of  the years  annuity returns  on elementary, 
secondary,   and higher education to  the averaged change  in national 
income from that year to  the next.     At  8% these ratios expressed in 
terms of percents range from 11% to 18% with a mean of 14% over the 
period 1960-72.     At  the 10% annuity rate,   the range is  from 13% - 22% 
with  a mean of 17% or exactly what Denison predicted with a technique 
using adjusted earnings differentials. 
Although the technique of  this analysis  is quite different 
from that used by Denison  the results of  these approaches are very 
similar.     This  similarity would seem to  lend some credibility to   the 
view that education has contributed to economic growth.     But the 
annuity analysis cannot be simplistically extrapolated into periods 
where data is not yet available.     Succinctly stated,  the dynamic 
nature of  the market does not allow the presumption that investments 
in activities which were profitable in the past will necessarily be 
so in the future. 
A more timely estimate of society's returns on current educational 
investments can be obtained by comparing rates of educational output 
TABLE VIII 
RELATIONSHIP OF TOTAL EDUCATIONAL ANNUITY RETURNS 
TO CHANGES  DJ NATIONAL  INCOME 
Sum of Annuity 
Returns for 
Elementary, 
Secondary, and 
Higher Education 
"I In Billion Dollars 
1. 
60 2.47 
61 3.12 
62 3.44 
63 3.86 
64 4.27 
.65 4.92 
66 5.39 
67 6.24 
68 6.78 
69 7.57 
70 8.51 
71 9.13 
72 9.69 
Three year 
Averages of 
Changes in 
National 
Income  in 
Portion of 
National 
Income 
Accounted  for 
by Educational 
Billion Dollars  Returns  in Percent 
19.6 
17.7 
22.5 
30.7 
36.9 
44.9 
44.9 
48.9 
49.8 
48.6 
48.2 
36.2 
85.1 
18 
18 
15 
13 
12 
11 
12 
13 
Sum of Annuity 
Returns for 
Elementary, 
Secondary, and 
Higher Education 
In Billion Dollars 
3.02 
3.82 
4.20 
4.70 
5.20 
6.01 
6.56 
7.61 
8.26 
9.23 
10.37 
11.13 
11.82 
Three year 
Averages of 
Changes in 
National 
Income in 
Portion of 
National 
Income 
Accounted for 
by Educational 
Billion Dollars Returns in Percent 
Source: Tables VI and VII. 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1973 edition, p 
Contemporary Economics. Specner, inside cover. 
19.6 
17.7 
22.5 
30.7 
36.9 
41.9 
44.9 
48.9 
49.8 
48.6 
48.2 
56.2 
85.1 
15 
22 
19 
15 
14 
13 
15 
17 
17 
19 
22 
20 
14 
317. 
Id 
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to occupational demands by level of education.  If society's subsidy 
of higher education is such that there is widespread underemployment 
of college trained workers, then it is likely that society could 
reduce its subsidy and attain nearly the same social benefit.  If 
marginally produced students are underemployed, the marginal costs 
of their education as borne by society could have been saved.  Had 
these marginal educational expenditures been saved, there would have 
been no great loss in social benefits.  This is the case because the 
marginally produced student is not working at a job which allows full 
use of his education and hence the full flow of the external social 
benefits. 
According to the forecasts discussed in Chapter I above, 
underemployment of many college educated workers can be expected. 
The analysis in this chapter does not refute the levels of public 
subsidy for higher education in the past in average terms, but the 
more current information on job market conditions indicate that 
marginal social costs exceed marginal social benefits. These 
forecasts for job market conditions indicate that society could spend 
less on higher education and improve its return on investments. 
As noted earlier, the circumstances for higher educational 
investments for individuals are not so responsive to aggregate 
conditions.  The many non-market private benefits to education, 
including the status provided by such training, continue to exist 
to some extent regardless of the nature of the individual's job. 
Thus, private returns rates to higher education are not as subject to 
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job market  conditions  as public benefits are.     A possibility for the 
public's  overinvestment in college education is consequently the result. 
In the present case,   the public is subsidizing the private benefits 
of individuals. 
The obvious policy prescription in light of  these conditions 
would  involve reducing the public subsidy to higher education. 
But  the momentum of  the educational industry presents considerable 
barriers  to  the implementation of such a policy.     Some of  these problems 
are discussed  in Chapters  III and IV below.     Chapter  III is  also a 
description  and critique of perhaps the most important recent works on 
higher education,   the Carnegie Commission's College Graduates and Jobs; 
Adjusting  to a New Labor Market Situation.22    Chapter IV will provide 
some  further development of  the annuity technique and an evaluation 
of another recent work which has been written on the new conditions 
facing colleges and  their students. 
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III.      PREVAILING  SOCIAL  POLICY: 
THE  CARNEGIE  COMMISSION ON HIGHER  EDUCATION 
The policy which the public sector has maintained toward 
higher education in  the past and the attitudes which individuals  have 
held toward their own prospects for post-secondary education are both 
subject to  extensive  revision whenever labor markets for educated 
manpower undergo marked change.    Although occupational needs are 
hardly  the only  source of demand for higher education,   the job market 
conditions  is  certainly a prime consideration in the decision to 
invest  in such  training. 
As discussed  in Chapter I,  official forecasts call for over- 
supplies of   college education manpower.     To reiterate,   the United 
States Bureau of   the Census  suggests  that according to occupational 
rates of use of college graduates  in 1960,   there will be 3.3 million 
more persons with a  college degree than will be required to maintain 
the status  quo in the various occupations.23    The 1972 Manpower Report 
of  the President predicted that 2.6 million of  the 9.8 million 
persons who are estimated to receive college education in the 1970's 
will go  into jobs which have been filled by lesser qualified people 
in the past.24    The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics has 
estimated  that only 20% of  the jobs of  the 1970's will require an 
education beyond high school.     This  is  in contrast to the fact that 
one-half of  the 18 - 21 age group in the United States attends  college 
at some time.25    The implications of these reports are that higher 
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educational output  in the United States is perhaps one-third or 
more in excess of what   it should be in terms of  occupational needs. 
Apparently  the growth in higher educational output capacity 
has been fueled by  the economic expansion of the past two decades. 
Additionally,   the conventional wisdom has strongly supported education 
and this has  led to conditions in institutions and in personal 
attitudes which amount  to a classic case of   'too much of a good thing.' 
Now that a segment of the population has recognized the potentially 
serious  oversupply problem,   some attention has been directed  toward 
evaluating the possible  consequences of reaction to these conditions 
by educational  institutions,  public administrators and the job market 
as  a whole. 
From 1967 till 1974,   the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 
existed as  a prestigious  and prolific source of information and opinion 
about  the circumstances  for higher education in the United States. 
Nearly one hundred publications were produced under its auspices and 
over six million dollars spent by  the Carnegie Commission in its 
six year life span.     Of  these works, College Graduates and Jobs: 
Adjusting  to a New Labor Market Situation,   26 published in 1973, 
is  one of  the last works done under the Commission's authority and  from 
the point of view of this paper is  the most  important.     This chapter 
is  a review and critique of the substantive policy prescriptions  of 
the Commission regarding the future of higher education vis a vis  the 
job market forecasts. 
On the surface,   the Carnegie Report cites  two major negative 
consequences which may come about if  the United States does generate 
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a secular oversupply of college educated manpower.  The first of these 
possibilities is unemployment of the superfluous manpower.  This 
consideration is presumably based upon the notion that excessive 
training renders one as incompatible with available jobs as does too 
little training.  The report correctly de-emphasizes this possibility 
in light of the favorable employment conditions which the relatively 
more highly trained have traditionally enjoyed in the markets. 
What is of great concern, however, is the second possible 
negative consequence, underemployment.  In the general economic sense, 
underemployment is the inefficient utilization of a productive resource. 
For present purposes, the term relates to the employment of persons in 
jobs which do not make full use of the person's productive capacities. 
As an extreme example, a person with a doctoral degree in engineering 
who is having to work as a cab driver is underemployed in the sense 
that his present occupation cannot employ him to the fullest of his 
capabilities.  Economically speaking, the person's human capital is 
inefficiently used after the fact of his investment in that training. 
In the unlikely event that this person knew prior to his training 
that there would be no engineering job available and that he would 
have to settle for an underemployed position at the completion of his 
training, then his decision to invest in such education would have 
been economically irrational. 
Obviously the engineer-cab driver would have been just as well 
off occupational^ without his Ph.D. training except for some personal 
benefits of the educational experience and the gratification gained 
from the achievement of the degree.  But in any case, these personal 
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aspects are unlikely  sources of sufficient compensation for having 
undergone such a rigorous and expensive educational program.     Few 
would not be disappointed  to learn at the completion of  their training 
they had no chance or only a meager one to exercise their abilities 
and skills.     This says nothing of society's  failure to realize a 
return on the costs which  it incurred in the engineer's  education.     How- 
ever,   the example  above is  rather extreme as  the degree of underemployment 
will not ordinarily be as great as in the case of a cab  driver with a 
doctoral degree.     What is more likely to be found is that the educational 
upgrading of some jobs   (that is  the filling of jobs with persons whose 
training is  superior to those who have  filled such jobs  in  the past) 
will in some instances make the job somewhat more productive but not 
so much more productive that a college degree is justified.     This 
condition amounts  to partial underemployment.     On the other hand,   in 
instances  such as   the cab  driver example the job  cannot be made more 
productive by more  training so there  is  absolute underemployment. 
In this  case,   none of the post-secondary educational skills are 
utilized. 
In most cases, however, it would appear likely that the 
educationally upgraded job will be made somewhat more productive when 
filled by a person with relatively more education than is normal but 
the advance in productivity will still not be in line with the full 
capacity of the occupationally downgraded individual.  Referring to 
job market forecasts, the Carnegie Commission Report makes the following 
statement on the subject of underemployment: 
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"Some of  the absorption of college graduates into 
the labor market will be relatively easy because 
the jobs will have been upgraded;  but some will be 
frustrating for the persons involved because the 
jobs have not been or cannot be upgraded.     Perhaps 
somewhere in the vicinity of one million to 1 1/2 
million college educater persons,   as a very rough 
guess, will  face this frustrating experience. 
But the same number would probably have ended up 
in about  the same types  of jobs if they had not 
gone  to college.    They are no worse off 
occupationally and often may be better off in 
other ways—for going to college  than they 
otherwise would have been.     The problem,   then, 
may be concentrated on about one-half of 
the 25% of the college educated persons who 
will enter educationally upgraded positions. 
The potential problem is this one more nearly 
for 10% than it is for 100% of college educated 
persons."27 
By way of clarification,   it is obvious that  the above 
paragraph connoted increased productivity with the phrase   'upgraded 
jobs'   in the beginning of the passage.     However,  in the next to  the 
last  sentence,   'educationally upgraded positions'   apparently refers 
to all positions which will  come to be occupied by the college 
educated and which have not been so filled in the past.     This inference 
is based on the Commission's reference  to the approximate twenty-five 
percent  of  the college educated who are forecast by the 1972 Manpower 
Report of the President  to go into   'educational upgrading.'     In  the 
earlier part of the paragraph cited above,   the Commission Report  seems 
to equate upgrading with increased productivity and in the latter 
instance the Report appears consistent with the Manpower Report usage 
of  the  term upgrading,   i.e.   educational upgrading of jobs consisting 
of greater productivity or underemployment or a combination of the two. 
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In this paper,   upgrading will mean the same as in the Manpower Report 
of the President  so one may say that   to the extent that educational 
upgrading does not  lead to increased productivity in a position then 
it  contributed to underemployment. 
An objection must be raised to the Carnegie Commission's state- 
ment  about  the numbers of  the college educated persons who will be 
underemployed.     The paragraph quoted above  from the Commission's 
teport is found in the text of  that work a scant  two pages  following a 
synopsis of the government agency oversupply forecasts mentioned 
earlier in this chapter.     It is surprising then that the Commission's 
words  do not more accurately reflect those of  the President's 1972 
Manpower Report to which the Commission refers  in this paragraph. 
Rather than the twenty-five percent figure for educational 
upgrading purported in the Commission report,   the 2.6 million upgraded 
jobs of  the 9.6 million jobs demanded during the seventies  is  actually 
twenty-seven percent.     Exacerbating the oversupply picture one must 
also note  that according to the Manpower Report the 9.6 million is 
the projected demand for the college trained including those who go 
into upgrading.     The forecast supply of  college educated workers is 
actually 9.8 million or another  .2 million which apparently will be 
completely excessive to the  labor market's needs.    According to the 
Manpower Report,   half of  the educational upgraders will go  into 
professional and technical occupations and the other half will go 
into   'other'  occupations.28    This projected even split may be what 
induced the Carnegie Commission to propose that half of the group 
will go into upgraded jobs  that will be made more productive since 
A3 
professional  and technical fields would seem more likely to be able 
to be made more productive.     Whether there will be only partial 
increases  in productivity of  these underemployed in these professional 
and  technical fields  is unclear, but some would appear likely in view 
of the numbers  involved. 
As   the Commission notes,   the idea that half of the 2.6 million 
educationally upgraded persons will not go underemployed is only a 
rough guess and the figure could well be much higher.     In any event, half 
of twenty-seven  (or even twenty-five)   is not  10% of  the college 
educated with whom we must be concerned with being underemployed as 
the report  states.     Rather,   the proportion is  13.5 percent  (1/2 x 27). 
Since the Carnegie Commission work was done in the expectation  that 
the overall economic situation was going to be in a state of recovery 
from the turn of   the decade recession rather  than in an even more 
severe  recession,   it seems  certain that  the mid-point  of  the seventies 
shows  considerably more underemployment  than  the Commission report 
suggested.     If  the Bureau of Labor Statistics  is  correct in stating 
that 80% of  this  decade's jobs are   'sufficiently'   filled by high 
school graduates,   then the picture is even more severe as college 
training output is perhaps  as much as 50% beyond requirements. 
In short,   the Carnegie Commission's own words of appraisal of the 
labor market  situation are very possibly unrealistic relative to  the 
present and future supply and demand situation in labor markets   for 
educated manpower. 
Another serious problem with the Commission's position as  it 
is  presented in the above paragraph exists.     Where  the report  refers  to 
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an individual's underemployment as a   'frustrating experience,'   it 
is undoubtedly correct in attaching negative personal  consequences 
to individuals  in finding job or appropriate challenge  to make 
full use of  their training.    At best,  however,   'frustrating experience' 
is a serious  understatement.     As noted in the  last  chapter,  there are 
personal gains  to be had from college attendance which exist aside 
from ones later occupational attainments.     But occupational expectations 
are almost  certainly a primary reason for investment  in post-secondary 
training.     Consequently,   one may consider the personal costs borne 
by the student and the unrealized return   'due'  his educational invest- 
ment  in superior income as something of a failure  for higher education. 
As  an example of this failure,   the  figures of Table  III  in 
Chapter II  indicate that men who attended publically supported four- 
year institutions  and who are not compensated with a better paying 
job effectively wasted up  to $4500 per year of college attendance.     For 
women,   the  figure  is $3100 per year of attendance.     In both cases, 
these sums  are subject to whatever offsetting effects occur from 
consumption and non-market benefits to such training.     For those who 
attended private universities the figure is well over a thousand 
dollars higher.     Multiplied by even the Carnegie Commission's  conser- 
vative estimate of 1.3 million underemployed times the number of 
unutilized years of  training,   these figures become extremely large no 
matter what reasonable assumptions are made about the offsets to  these 
costs.     Adding  to this,  the uncompensated contribution to higher education 
which other sources provide as in Column 3 of Table  III the   'waste'   is 
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shewn in even further magnitude, another 3/4 to 1 3/4 billion dollars 
per year. 
Oversupplying ourselves with college level talent  is no doubt 
a very expensive as well as a   'frustrating experience.'     As the above 
quotation from the  Commission report states: 
"But  the same number would probably have ended 
up in the  same types of jobs if  they had not 
gone  to college.     They  (the upgraded ones) 
are no worse off occupationally.   .   ." 
The point  is  that they,   the upgraded ones, while no worse off 
occupationally are much worse off  in an opportunity investment  sense. 
For the marginally produced students whose investments  in education 
were motivated by aspirations toward superior job openings,   their 
costs in time,  money,  and frustration are for nothing when they 
cannot utilize their training in their careers.     The same is true 
for the public as a whole who acting as a supporter for higher 
education in the expectation of  receiving some benefit would also be 
•no worse off  had they diverted the subsidy to the superfluously 
trained toward other projects. 
It would seem that  a great part of society's benefits  to 
higher education would come through the individual's productivity 
in his employment.     If  the  individual students'   productive  capacity 
is  stifled by an occupation which will not allow him to exploit his 
full capacity,   then it would appear that  society also foregoes a 
benefit  to the students'  underemployment.     Since investors  in higher 
education ordinarily do not bear the full costs of  their training in 
the United States,   then the   'other supporters of education have,   like 
the student himself,  made a bad  investment. 
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Past  investments in occupationally superfluous  training are 
irretrievable and not in themselves so much the problem.    What  should 
gain primary attention though  is   the  fact  that the public sector is 
continuing to sink funds  in unprofitable educational investments. 
As noted in the last  chapter,   investments in higher education as late 
as 1971  seemed to be paying their way on the average, but the projections 
for oversupplies  of  the college trained which are  forecast indicate 
that  the marginal costs of higher education borne by the public as a 
whole exceed  the marginal benefits  thus bringing down the average 
public benefits.     This excessive investment hypothesis  can only be 
incorrect if  there are significant social benefits  to an underemployed 
person's  education which accrue from sources other  than through  the 
upgraded ones  employment.     While  the degree to which an individual 
through post-secondary education  is made a better neighbor and  citizen 
is open to considerable question,   it does not seem likely that  these 
effects  are  really comparable to the contribution to the overall 
quality of  life which  the more highly trained are potentially capable 
of making  in their participation in the job market. 
To reiterate this  important point,   the marginal social costs of 
educating excessive numbers  of persons are in excess of  the marginal 
benefits.     Additionally,   the overprovision of educational opportunity 
by the public sector has certainly led to a lower level of  college 
admission standards  than would otherwise be the case.     Surely,   this 
condition has  encouraged the marginal students  to pursue training which 
may in fact not provide an adequate  return on their investment because 
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of job market  limitations.     And yet the summation of the Carnegie 
Commission report is   .   .   . 
"We should not take any panicked actions.     The 
budgets of higher education should not be cut 
because of the labor market situation.     Student 
aid should not generally be reduced.     We should 
not  reverse the trend toward open-access admissions 
to  the system of higher education." 
The position from which this paper is written is that the 
Carnegie Commission has  throughout its report  assumed the conventional 
point of view that education is a near sacred institution and that 
public support for  this institution should flow on the basis of 
faith alone.     The composition of  the Carnegie Commission perhaps 
explains  the assumption of  this view.     Of  the nineteen members of 
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education,  nine were or had been 
college presidents.     Two more of the members were college professors 
so that a clear majority of  influence on the Commission's  activities 
was  from the higher education industry.     The remainder of the members 
included lawyers,   association executives,   and businessmen.     The 
fact  that the panel was dominated by persons from the educational 
sector is in itself not an indictment of  the Commission's motives. 
But  the  composition of the Board can more  than likely be safely taken 
as an indicator of academic conservatism.     The possibilities for 
expression of this conservatism are considerable. 
The Carnegie Commission maintains  that  the present conditions 
of oversupply of  the  college trained in the labor market are preferable 
to the   alternative of  implementation of a controlled economy style of 
manpower planning policy.     This paper finds  the Commission undoubtedly 
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correct on this point.     The rigidities which a centralized manpower 
planning policy would impose on the market not  to mention the 
restriction of personal freedom of students are entirely inconsistent 
with  the goals of  free market economic and social systems.     As well, 
there  can be no presumption that  there is a reliable means by which 
such a policy could accurately target the manpower training needs of 
coming years.     Citing the noticable shifts which have occurred in 
enrollment patterns  in response to changes in career opportunities, 
the Commission correctly emphasizes  the efficacy of market forces 
and market information in promoting social welfare. 
What appears to have escaped the Commission's attention,   though, 
is  that  'free'   market forces are strongly affected by the  'other' 
support for higher education.     In view of the amounts of excess 
training  to which  the economy is subject,   the  inescapable conclusion 
to be drawn is  that this support  is wasteful and that  it also goes 
some distance  toward restricting the market's output and  toward 
encouraging wasteful private investments as well.     Additionally,   it 
must be noted  that rigid manpower planning is not  the only alternative 
to the present system.     General cuts  in public support  to higher education 
which would raise the private burden and discourage overinvestment 
through the price mechanism is another alternative.     A reduction of 
higher education's output capacity leaving privately borne costs the 
same and restricting the supply of  college openings  is still another 
means  of  limiting wasteful investment.     The fact that manpower planning 
is undesirable does not mean that the maintenance of  the status 
quo  is  the preferable course of social action. 
Another point behind the Commission's support of  a 
conservative approach to dealing with the oversupply situation is  that 
massive  cutbacks  in colleges'   financial support would produce undesirable 
shock effects  to the educational system.     Among these effects  is  the 
detriment to the nation's supply of  reserve human capital which 
might be needed for unforeseen circumstances.     Some recent experiences 
indicate that this  is something of an unwarranted concern.     Recognized 
national goals  for achieving certain quantities and types of 
occupational training have been met on or ahead of schedule in this 
country.     While supplies of  specially trained people cannot be brought 
up overnight,   it has been shown that investors in higher  education are 
quite responsive to  favorable occupational trends and to subsidies 
applied  to study.     For example,   the President's Science Advisory 
Committee in 1962 set a target for 1970 of at least  7500 doctoral 
degrees per year for each field of engineering,  mathematics,   and 
physics  as  the means  of alleviating what the Committee saw as  a 
shortage of training in these occupations.     The federally supported 
trainee programs which were implemented to bring about these doctorates 
were successful in reaching their goal two years ahead of schedule. 
For lesser degree programs,   the unprecedented expansion of educational 
institutions  of this period led to a 100%  increase in the number of 
Bachelor's degrees granted in  1970 over that figure of 1960.3° 
Continuing present levels of public support to higher education for 
the sake of maintaining reser-e capacity then seems overcautious  given 
the high elasticity of supply for the highly trained. 
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A side aspect of  this market responsiveness in the supply of 
college educated  labor involves the amount of and the quality of 
information available  to students which can be used in selecting 
a field of study appropriate  to an occupation.    There appears   to be 
something of a corn-hog cycle which results from uncertainty as well as 
from oversubsidized education.    The earnings  levels of farmers  in 
the past  century may have provided a good idea of what newcomers to 
farming might  earn throughout a career.     Such reasoning is not  so 
applicable at present.     As evidenced by the attractive opportunities 
which were  available to Ph.D. 's in college faculty and business staff 
positions  during the 1950's and 1960's,   the market of college faculties 
has done a near  complete reversal in less than the time it would take 
to complete a bachelor's  degree and then a doctorate.    The same is also 
true of the situation for lower level teachers which were produced in 
huge numbers  only to be  left with insufficient demand as grammar 
and secondary school enrollments declined with the passage of the 
baby boom generation. 
In either of these cases and in many more similar situations 
masses of students have based their career training investment  decisions 
on information which was  inadequate over time.     As the economic system 
comes  to demand more specialization of training and skills it simultaneously 
increased the danger for one to become underemployed simply because 
the technological composition of the economic order does not provide 
for an unlimited number of any single occupation group even though 
potentials  for any type of position are flexible to some degree. 
51 
The questions  arise,  how can the information on which educational 
decisions  are made be improved in terms of reducing uncertainty 
and who will provide the information?    The answers are quite complex. 
The Carnegie Commission calls   for more research and publications on 
future employment opportunities by individual trade associations. 
While these organizations would seem to be a logical choice on the 
surface,   they would also have to be somewhat suspect because of   their 
conflicts  of interest.     The possibilities are numerous but since  trade 
associations are generally composed of established people in the field 
it would be to advantage in some cases to encourage the flow of  labor 
market information which might restrict the flow of new entrants  into 
the field.     The medical profession has sometimes been accused of   this 
type of motive in restricting the number of medical schools. 
On the other hand,  other circumstances may provide for an 
association's interest in promoting optimistic outlooks on the 
prospects   for trained workers.     Certainly  the American Association 
of University Professors as one example would have an interest in 
keeping college enrollments at high levels.     In short,   such associations 
may not be particularly reliable. 
As an alternative, however,   federal and state governments 
participation in this  area of providing for socially beneficial 
information  is quite  appropriate and well-established.    Through 
exercising already well-developed machinery for conducting research, 
federal grants to  teams of multidisciplinary researchers would likely 
provide more  objectivity and competence to the task of determining 
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manpower needs than could be counted on from any other source.  At 
the same time, this project would help to employ some elements of 
this national research capacity which of late has been underutilized. 
Gaining a clear perspective on increasingly dynamic conditions 
in future occupational needs of this country is a challenging objective 
of considerable national importance and is therefore best left to 
the most capable and unbiased research facilities available. This is 
not to ignore the biases of university research departments, but rather 
to opt for a reliance on established professionalism in information 
gathering.  In any event, a move away from the influence of vested 
interest college administrators on public policy is strongly indicated. 
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IV.     PREVAILING  SOCIAL  POLICY 
THE NATIONAL  BOARD  ON  GRADUATE EDUCATION 
The Carnegie Commission report,  College Graduates and Jobs,31 
reviewed in Chapter  III above can be summarized as a conservative 
appraisal of  the probable adverse social consequences associated with 
overinvestment in higher education.     This conservatism is not incon- 
sistent with what one would expect  from college professors  and 
administrators  and indeed the Carnegie Commission is dominated in 
numbers by academics. 
The National Board of Graduate Education  (N.B.G.E.)   is an 
organization which is   complementary to the Carnegie Commission. 
The Board was  established in 1971 by the Conference Board of 
Associated Research Councils.     This  latter organization is composed 
of the American Council on Education,   the Social Science Research 
Council,   the American Council of Learned Societies,   and the National 
Research Council.     The N.B.G.E.   is made up of  twenty-five persons 
from education,  business,   and law backgrounds who were selected by 
the Conference Board primarily to provide what  the Board called 
*a critical review and analysis of  issues pertaining to the labor 
market  for highly educated persons.'32    The focus of the N.B.G.E.'s 
attention  is  on  the doctoral degree and the Board's   first publication, 
Doctorate Manpower Forecasts and Policy,   relates almost completely 
to Ph.D.   level   training.33    Much of  the argument in  the paper,  however, 
is easily generalized to other levels of higher education. 
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As with  the Carnegie report, Doctorate Manpower Forecasts and 
Policy is  concerned with public reaction to job market conditions vis 
a vis higher educational subsidy.     The Board report portends the 
dangers which it perceives inherent in alternative methods of 
determining appropriate levels of subsidy for higher education. 
The first of  these alternatives  is what the N.B.G.E.   terms a 
'human capital approach.'^    As a general definition,  a human capital 
approach amounts  to basing educational support on some notion of  the 
benefits  gained by the particular training.     In other words,   if  the 
marginal social costs of providing a doctorate level philosopher are 
not exceeded or at  least equaled by the marginal social benefits  to 
that   training,   then the suhsidy funds should be spent elsewhere. 
Doctorate Manpower Forecasts and Policy concisely dismisses 
this   type of analysis  as a source of educational policy on the 
grounds  that such techniques have traditionally concentrated on  the 
private factors of educational investments and that  this analysis 
only relates  to efficiency which "...   is only one of the values 
among many  that should determine public policy."35    As Chapter II 
of this paper shows,   even though human capital approaches  to higher 
education have traditionally been concerned with the private aspects of 
training,   there  is no reason why social aspects cannot be brought 
into account and even quantified. 
One noteworthy fact is that the human capital analysis here 
used suggests  that  the  ratio of marginal social benefits  to marginal 
social  costs seems  clearly less  favorable toward present levels of 
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educational output than the privately realized benefits and costs 
relationship.     The social benefits flowing from higher education 
seem most in evidence as the result of job market utilization of 
acquired skills.     Impressive forecasts indicate that the job market 
can at present and will in the future be able to operate efficiently 
with fewer high level degrees  than we now produce.     Consequently, 
society could reduce its educational expenditures  for occupationally 
redundant  training and be better off for doing so.     On the other hand, 
expectations of superior incomes augmented by the spectrum of 
personal non-market benefits to education reveal something about  the 
relatively  greater benefits from higher education accruing to individuals 
at the margin  than to the public sector.     Human capital analysis  then 
may not be objectionable to the N.B.G.E.  because it is  limited in 
scope but rather because it is capable of being so thoroughly applied. 
A second comment on the National Board of Graduate Education's 
stand on human capital analysis must be made concerning its apparent 
notion of  the word efficiency in the above reference.     The Board in 
stating that efficiency "is only of the values that should determine 
public policy.   .   ."36 implies that efficiency is inherently a dollar 
and cents business kind of concept.     The notion of efficiency should 
and can be more reasonably used to evaluate non-quantifiable as well 
as quantifiable things.     Society's and individuals'   successes  in 
attaining their goals of making themselves productive and in furthering 
their culture are intimately related to the efficiency of   the social 
and economic systems.    The Board is  simply short sighted in clinging 
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to the subjective terms of analysis which they have employed.     Educational 
administrators,   students,   government agencies as well as  the electorate 
should have access  to the most enlightened data available so  that they 
might choose a course for higher education on a more sound basis. 
In preference to a new ordering of graduate education priorities 
based on human capital analysis the National Board of Graduate Education 
defends   the   'free student choice1   system,   the status quo, now in effect. 
But the Board does not see that a human capital approach as  the main 
threat to the free choice system.     Rather the Board seems more concerned 
with calls for a national manpower policy.     As in the case for the 
Board's use of the word efficiency and the Carnegie Commission's 
use of   'upgrading,'   a clarification of terms is  in order. 
By manpower policy the Board rather narrowly intends the type of 
manpower policy found in the controlled economy,   i.e.,   the attempt 
to provide training opportunities and education according to some 
centrally determined goals  for the economy.     Even if these  types  of 
systems were successful in other countries which the Board denies, 
manpower policy is objectionable on the grounds it  interferes with 
the exercise of  free choice and enterprise.     Rather than attempt 
the impossible in predicting future occupational needs,   the Board 
feels that the  invisible hand is better left to determine the training- 
job mix. 
In its attack on manpower planning,   the Board cites Howard 
Bowen.     Bowen advances  an inherently persuasive argument by noting that 
future manpower needs are not  inflexibly defined and that the free 
choice system is  superior in terms of  its capacity to translate social 
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welfare of tomorrow's society.37 Bowen also cautions against the 
belief that graduate education should only be considered as training 
for a specific occupation.  Rather, he believes that the ability to 
change the nature of their jobs which the highly trained provide for 
the market place is some sort of benefit to graduate education which 
transcends the usual one-to-one type of thinking which is ordinarily 
applied to training and jobs.  In short, the National Board of Graduate 
Education in concert with Bowen soundly discourages the use of their 
notion of a manpower planning approach as a viable policy in reaction 
to the forecast oversupplies of the highly trained. 
The N.B.G.E. also objects to the 'on again-off again' federal 
policy of support toward graduate education (the report cites 51,446 
predoctoral students were supported on federal fellowships in fiscal 
1968 and only 6600, an 87% decline were similarly supported in fiscal 
1974).38 In this objection, the Board appears to be well founded in its 
fear that federal manpower policy is strongly affected by short term 
trends in employment.  It is likely, however, that economic fluctuations 
also play a part in this decline in support.  In any event, building 
up a graduate degree machine of the magnitude of that found in the 
United States and suddenly underutilizing this capacity is an 
unignorable indication of the pains of economic transition if not 
economic inefficiency. 
What Bowen and the Board do not explore, however, is that 
manpower planning need not be so narrowly defined as that system used 
in the controlled economies.  In promulgating the case for free student 
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choice   (the status quo)   in graduate education the National Board of 
Graduate Education has in fact attacked two  extremes,   a narrowly 
defined human  capital approach on one hand and a rigidly defined man- 
power policy approach on the other.     In attacking the viability of 
these alternatives,   the Board  implies that the status quo is all  that 
is left.     In fact,  a wide spectrum of alternatives exist. 
It is worthy of note that  the United States has had a manpower 
policy of a different sort  for some time.    That policy was not 
similar to  the manpower planning of  controlled economies.     As discussed 
in Chapter III,   educational policy of the 1960's was  favorable to 
graduate education revealing the government's  interest  in providing 
targeted numbers of Ph.D.   chemists,  physicists,   and engineers. 
Production of graduate degrees was spurred by research funds poured 
into these programs.     Now the United States still has a manpower 
policy which also reflects  the preceived needs of the times. 
Recognition of the needs for graduate training and the  funds for 
its provision has  substantially changed.     Painful though any economic 
transition from the climate of one market to the next may be,   one 
lesson is  consistently demonstrated:     the sooner the  transition is 
acknowledged the less painful the conversion is  likely to be. 
Future absolute enrollments  in colleges and universities will begin 
to decline at the beginning of the next decade leaving diminished 
demand for a significant number of academic Ph.D.'s already in the 
market.     To subsidize the training of additional Ph.D.'s  in the mean- 
time seems  ill-advised at best. 
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The free student  choice system championed by the N.B.G.E. 
has intuitive appeal.     This appeal deserves closer scrutiny than it 
normally receives,   however.     The free aspect of an opportunity 
ordinarily implies  that  there are no unusual restrictions to  the 
decision to pursue the opportunity.     In the case of graduate education, 
costs in dollars and in time are assumed here to be ordinary restrictions. 
Bans of other types such as government imposed quotas as would be 
found in a strict manpower policy would have to be considered unusual 
restrictions.     In a sense subsidies must be seen as something of an 
unusual negative restriction.    As  is commonly shown in the market 
experience,   such  forces go some distance toward structuring the 
composition of  the market's output.     If public support  (subsidy) 
of higher education were cut or eliminated then the numbers receiving 
such training must   fall as  costs of training rise,  opportunities for 
training  fall,   or both.     If the proposition of this paper concerning 
the excesses  in the supplies of  the highly trained manpower is  correct, 
then it follows  that a subsidy inducing higher educational training 
encourages an artificial alteration in the labor market relative 
to what that market might produce if a   'truly free student  choice' 
market were  to exist. 
Windham and others have suggested that public support for 
higher education contributes  to income redistribution patterns which 
favor  the  rich rather than the poor.39    This position is  lent some 
credence by the  recognition that  subsidies of higher educational 
degrees encourage marginally produced students to seek the private 
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benefits  to education at the public's expense.     The portion of  educa- 
tional subsidy accounted for by taxes of  low income persons then aides 
the typically higher socio-economic class college students according 
to Windham. 
Nonetheless,   this source of  subsidy for college training is 
to some unidentified extent  compensated in terms of the social benefit 
as  in encouraging economic growth.     This  is contrary to Windham's- 
assumption that  there are no social benefits  to higher education. 
For the superfluously produced college graduate,   however, whose  skill 
will be underemployed,   it can be said that the degree of  support for 
his  education coming from the lower income groups must be recognized 
as an uncompensated income transfer in the form of a personal benefit 
to education.     That is true at least if one follows  this paper's assumption 
that  social benefits  to education come about almost exclusively  through 
the job market participation of those receiving the  training. 
The N.B.G.E.   is supporting a   'free student  choice'   market  for 
higher education.     But in actuality,   the Board is  applying the appeal 
of the argument  for free enterprise to a market  situation which  is 
hardly a model of free enterprise due to the artificially favorable 
circumstances surrounding the availability of graduate degrees to 
potential  investors. 
It  is difficult  to delve into  the N.B.G.E.   report without  noting 
that  its support of   'free choice'   in the graduate education market 
is not so contradictory a position to a human capital approach.     The 
question becomes:     Why not have better terms of analysis?    The 
information which  the N.B.G.E. wants  to see provided as listed 
in its recommendation #4  is as follows: 
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"Only  the federal government has the capability 
and  the  authority to collect consistent 
and comprehensive data on trends pertinent to 
the  labor market  for highly educated man- 
power,   and we urge it  to exercise this 
responsibility.    At a minimum,   these 
data should include enrollment  trends by 
field and  institution,   trends in 
financial support  for graduate students 
by field and institution; job place- 
ments and salaries of graduates,  as well 
as analysis of  unemployment and under- 
employment ;   trends in research and development 
expenditures,   and the distribution 
of  these expenditures by  type of 
institution and source of funds  contin- 
uously revised projections of the future 
market for the various  types of highly, 
trained manpower are also needed.   .   . 40 
It must be kept in mind that human capital analysis can 
transcend the efficiency criticism discussed earlier in this chapter. 
The N.B.G.E.   recommendation #4 above  calls  for sufficient information 
upon which a rather sophisticated cost-benefit human capital analysis 
could be based.     Undoubtedly,   education's costs and benefits for the 
public sector as well as for individuals could be reasonably be 
determined on this  information.     As such,  human capital analysis 
would put this information in much more usable form for all 
of  the various decision makers. 
The N.B.G.E. assertion that 'efficiency' is not a sufficient 
criterion for evaluation appears somewhat contradictory in light of 
the  following.     The Board is in fact suggesting that  the   'free choice' 
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system of  the past be realigned under improved information services 
that render the system quite well suited for enlightened human capital 
analysis. 
This  analysis  could be also constructed so as  to place some 
premium on accomplishing concurrent economic and social goals not 
included in the Board's efficiency terms.     These goals  include the 
promotion of graduate education among women and minorities  and in 
keeping  the ranks of Ph.D.'s adequately staffed with the vitality 
of  'new blood'   as  the Board also suggests.    As well,   the fulfillment 
of occupational needs  in specific high need areas such as medical 
fields  could be made. 
It is always  difficult to clearly demonstrate self-interest or 
professional perspective;  but given  the conservatism and self- 
serving nature of  the Board's  report,  it is  tempting to suspect a 
Carnegie Commission type of aversion to the availability of  information 
which adversely affects public sentiment toward higher educational 
support.     Upon examination of  the Board's composition,   the suspicion 
of academic influence  is borne out.     Of the twenty-five Board 
members,   twenty-one are college or university presidents or professors. 
Of  the rest,   two come from research organizations,   one from business, 
and one from law. 
This is not to say that the positions of the Carnegie Commission 
or the N.B.G.E. are indefensible by any means.  No market enterprise 
is efficiently operated in the turmoil of violent ups and downs.  The 
jolts in support of education have certainly not been conducive to 
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maximizing  this sector's contribution to social welfare.     Further, 
if one is  at all in agreement with  the Galbraith  'public sector 
undernourishment'   type of  thinking,   then perhaps the maintenance of 
some of  the sacrosanct aura which has  typically shrouded education in 
the United States is overall beneficial to the public.     If this 
aura has existed  to some extent on the electorates ignorance of  the 
external  social benefits  to higher education then this ignorance has 
promoted social welfare.     In such a case,   the market distance  that 
exists between educational administrators and education's primary 
supporters,   taxpayers,   is not at all an unfortunate phenomenon for 
vested interest administrators and may in fact not be so unfortunate 
for the public either.     But because of the oversupplies,   this market 
distance may now be shown as conducive to economic inefficiency and 
a more painful labor market transition. 
This paper is not only concerned with graduate    education 
but with all levels of higher education.     The discussion of  the 
N.B.G.E.'s  report should be easily generalized to apply to this 
broader range of concerns; but of course,   the situation for each level 
of learning is somewhat dissimilar as  are  the degrees themselves. 
The current popular associations which are made with various degrees 
may have in fact been a contributing factor to the oversupply of  the 
higher of the post-secondary educational facilities.     For instance, 
the requirement for the Bachelor's degree which was granted by  the 
University of North Carolina in 1840 are reproduced below: 
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FRESHMAN 
Livy 
SOPHOMORE JUNIOR SENIOR 
Graeca Majora 
Virgil's Georgics    Homer 
Graeca Majora Horace 
Algebra Latin Writing 
Cicero's Orations    Trigonometry 
Geometry Logarithms 
Geometry 
Juvenal 
Demosthenes 
Navigation and 
Surveying 
Mechanical 
Philosophy 
Modern 
Geography 
Cicero Chemistry and 
Tacitus Mineralogy 
Latin Mental Philosophy 
Construction    Moral Philosophy 
Mechanical Graeca Majora 
Philosophy        Horace 
Logic Latin 
Rhetoric Construction 
Greek Tragedy    Astronomy 
Calculus French 
History and        Political Economy 
Chronology        National and 
Constitutional Law 
Chemistry and Geology 
Cicero      11 
The curriculum of  that era  is strikingly unfamilar to the course 
requirements  of  that institution today.     What is  important,   though, 
is that   the B.A.   once had the tradition of being  the gentleman's 
status  symbol,   and was probably something of an elitist social 
instrument employed  to produce the manpower for  the learned 
professions.     In no way was it to be considered everyman's 
occupational  training. 
The association of the Bachelor's degree with enhanced income 
and social position has  continued though the degree itself has changed. 
The familar equation of getting ahead by going to  college was nearly 
an indoctrination for generations of American high school students 
and perhaps still  is.     Coupled with an expanding level of general 
income,   the United States adopted  the Bachelor's degree as  one of 
its more formal characteristics distinguishing the  upwardly mobile. 
In concentrating  on college,   the benefits of technical and career 
education were relatively undemoticed. 
The  growth in importance of  the Associate degree of  late 
may well be unaffected by the popular realization that not everyone 
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can become  an executive.     Further,   it becomes increasingly clear that 
Bachelor's degrees are not in fact guarantees of success and certainly 
are not  qualification to do a particular job even though degree 
requirements have been brought more in line with current occupational 
interests.     If Bachelors degree holders experience declines in their 
incomes   (which is  the expected result of an expansion in supply, 
a contraction in demand or both)   then returns on investment in higher 
education will of course also decline.     If our capacity for producing 
highly educated manpower is  indeed oversubsidized then the promotion 
of oversupplies of Bachelor's and other degrees  in the market will 
add to the wastefulness of education.    This wastefulness takes  the 
form of encouraging students  toward investment in excessive levels of 
education to meet non-existent occupational demand. 
The lower costs, both publically and privately borne,   of   two- 
year and  technical institutions provide more attractive alternatives 
to the more expensive Bachelor's degree.    Of  late,   all levels of 
higher education have expanded enrollments so it would be difficult 
to say that  the lesser institutions were much in competition for 
students with the four-year schools.     But demographic factors will 
bring about absolute declines  in enrollments by the beginning of 
the next  decade and as lesser institutions improve their showing in 
providing career training,  it is likely that the decision to  invest 
in a  four-year degree will come to take on the meaning which  it once 
held.     The four-year educational degree  is largely composed of personal 
and non-occupational benefits,  something of a luxury in personal 
interest which  is probably less justifiably supported by the public 
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than the training provided by more career oriented programs in what 
are now the  two-year  institutions. 
This  is not to say,  however,   that the four-year college 
degree institutions  are necessarily doomed.    The self-preservation 
motive of  the four-year schools will probably promote their expansion 
into the field of technical training and associate degrees  in attempt to 
maintain enrollments  at levels high enough to utilize their facilities. 
Except  for  the highest level schools,   the prestigious Bachelor's 
programs will increasingly be forced to accept the heretofore 
unworthy neighbors of  technical education and two-year degrees. 
Trends in education like those in population are difficult 
to predict,   but there are strong reasons to believe that  the 
300% increases  in non-degree credit enrollments which occurred in 
the United States over the  1962-72 decade bears witness to a pattern which 
will be continued into the future.   '     As such,   the non-polluting 
and intellectually stimulating nature of education encourages the 
belief that  the increasing numbers of  the population will willingly 
or as an alternative pursue informal education in their hours of 
recreation. 
Another example of a force which will alter the complexion of 
higher education in the  future is the expanding need for retraining. 
As workers skills from past  investments in human capital become 
subject  to the  forces of accelerating technology and its parallel 
effect  in skill obsolescence, more people will return to education 
to keep pace with advancing technology. 
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A third factor contributing to the new types of demands for 
less formal education involves standards which are adventitious to 
conventional market efficiency analysis.    The nation has become 
committed to the goal of providing equalized occupational opportunities 
to deprived groups,   chiefly blacks.    Remedial types of occupational 
education to aid in this objective appear to be more reasonable 
alternatives  to conventional  four-year programs which require more 
active participation,  higher costs,  and an occupationally superfluous 
curriculum.     Bachelor degree remedial education for the existing 
numbers   of these groups which are already of labor force age  is 
neither practical,  realistically necessary for much occupational 
opportunity,  nor economically feasible.     For the present college 
age members of disadvantaged groups who aspire to careers which do 
demand four years  of  training,   the motive to supply them with 
competitive levels of  skills  is seen here as one of the major 
justifications  for continuing to support higher education at  levels 
which would provide somewhat excessive output. 
Until a method of providing education is  found which will 
better promote minority access  to higher degrees,  a contracted public 
subsidy method as  currently found may be a necessary although an 
admittedly  imperfect best alternative.    Parenthetically,   the recent 
interest generated in the schemes which allow full financing by the 
student of  the  full cost of his education are not  felt to be a possible 
answer to the higher education problem of providing access  to minorities. 
Any such system of financing massive expenditures  on investments in 
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human capital runs up against  the specter of intangible collateral 
on the one hand and a well-established legal precedent which has 
not promoted any system of indentured labor on the other. 
Incurring a huge debt early in life would likely be especially 
discouraging to  the economically disadvantaged who ironically are the 
group which full  financing schemes are intended to help.    As the nation 
is painfully in the process of trying to slough off the traces of 
social oppression,   it  is not likely that those groups who were most 
affected by social bonds in the past will seek any sort of formal 
financial bondage in attempt to pursue an uncertain future. 
To   reiterate,   education subsidized for social benefits and for 
the achievement of social goals may be the best alternative.     But 
this  is not  to say that public subsidy need be continued at the  levels 
which have  prevailed in the past.     Rather,   the suggestion is made to 
realign public sector support in terms of more realistic appraisals  of 
the newly assessed social benefits to higher education.     It would 
be essential in such a policy shift to maintain recognition of  the 
differences  in the relative public benefits  flowing from specific 
levels of education,   adult and continuing education,   technical 
training,   associate degree education, Bachelor's, Master's and 
Doctoral degrees.     Further attention will have  to be placed on the 
divisions  of specialty within these various levels.     For instance, 
those types of training which could more readily be identified with 
present  and future labor market needs would appropriately demand 
greater public support in line with the greater social benefits 
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accruing to this  training.    Adding to public support  for medical 
training to  the present demands for health personnel  is an excellent 
example.     A shift in the public sector's priorities in these regards 
would seem inevitable and desirable as  the growing magnitudes of 
discrepancies between occupational relevance on one hand and costs 
for various   types and levels of education on the other becomes 
popularly recognized. 
It  is  important to note that both the public as well as  the 
private costs of  two years of technical or associate degree  training are 
considerably  less than half the costs of a four-year program.     Obviously 
only half as many years of  training are involved and the lower level 
training can be provided more cheaply per year.     Based on estimates 
by Gary T.   Barnes  and the North Carolina Department of Community 
Colleges,   the annual differential public subsidy to a student  in 
North Carolina taking  four years of college level training versus a 
student   taking two years of  community college or technical school is 
in the range  of $5000.43    This sum is then a public gain for every 
student who elects the  lesser training in line with more realistic 
occupational  demands. 
A recent study by the Research Triangle Institute suggests that 
the North Carolina economy between 1970 and 1980 will require approximately 
67,000 more enrollees  in technical and vocational training programs 
than the  state will have.     In contrast,   the supplies of  those who 
obtain college degrees   in the decade are in excess of projected 
occupational quantity demanded.     For those without degrees with one 
to three years  of  college training will also exceed Job market placed 
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for such  levels.   *     In view of these projections,  It seems likely 
that public sentiment  toward support of  four-year programs will 
change as   the conditions of  this forecast materialize.     Relatively 
greater emphasis  on more occupationally oriented higher educational 
programs is  one  realignment of  priorities  to be expected. 
This discussion is in no way intended to downgrade the 
benefits  to Bachelor's degree programs.     Rather it suggests that 
such training be placed back into the setting for which it is more 
suited,   that  is,   one of less occupation relevance and greater personal 
consumption benefits.     A reduction in public subsidy could be expected 
to contribute to  two important social goals.     It would reduce  the public 
sector's debt burden for such programs,   thus bringing them into more 
consistency with the public benefits and costs  relationships available 
from other levels   of  training,  associate,   technical, and continuing 
education being chief among them.     As noted in Chapter II,   the recent 
levels of public investments  in higher education were apparently paying 
their way as   late  as  1971.     But given the growing amounts of under- 
employment of Bachelor's degree training and the lower costs 
associated    with less prestigous  training,   it would appear that a less 
occupationally effective alternative exists for the public  to achieve 
its goals of  training itself.     Secondly,  shifting more of college 
training costs  to  individual investors or lowering educational 
availability to students may encourage private investment in less 
expensive alternatives.     This policy would appropriately discourage 
private overinvestment in higher education which is erroneously based on 
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exaggerated expectations of future market demands.     New educational 
policy must shift  the cost burden for occupationally redundant market 
training onto the personal and consumption benefits  for which the 
higher degrees  are presumably better suited. 
Any  changes  in the availability of conventional four-year 
educational programs will not necessarily affect the cultural exposure 
of the population in the long run.     Enrollment  in college has  led 
most students  to postpone a career until the completion of  their 
training.     But  there is no reason that the less occupationally relevant 
aspects of the Bachelor's degree cannot be pursued along with ones 
employment.     Thus,   students may obtain occupational education 
in one or two years, begin a career and then finish a degree afterwards. 
The side effects  of such a system are not altogether undesirable. 
For instance,   gross national expenditures on investments in higher 
education would likely be lower than at present.    The lessening 
in foregone national  income  (foregone national product)  which now 
occurs   in the system of excluding educational investments from 
occupational pursuits in terms of  time could be avoided. 
By postponing degree  completion,   students may note an 
alleviation of  the problem of determining what course of study to 
choose prior to the development of their mature interests.    Whether 
the public or private benefits of such a new order would out-weigh 
the costs  in  terms  of foregone cultural exposure is certainly not 
clear from this hypothetical discussion.    The important thing  is to 
maintain awareness of  the cultural losses to society associated with 
diminished output of  the higher degrees.     Should the social benefits 
in cultural exposure prove great,   the social costs of no longer 
providing four-year degrees would have to be accounted for in some 
fashion in the decision to cut public support to such education. 
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V.      SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS 
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The overall purpose of  this paper has been to evaluate United 
States social policy toward higher education.     Such an evaluation is 
especially appropriate  at the present  time because of  the changes  in 
job market  conditions which have come about in the recent past.     The 
paper recognizes   that college training is not only of value in providing 
job skills.     Personal non-market aspects of college  training are also 
acknowledged.     But  these aspects of education are viewed in what this 
paper considers   a proper perspective,   specifically,   the non-market 
benefits to higher education are essentially gains to individuals and 
do not make  so important a contribution to society's benefit to education. 
Private benefits  do not justify public subsidy. 
Chapter  II has dealt with an analysis  of  the costs and benefits 
to higher education both for individuals and society.     The analysis 
in Chapter   II does not  indicate that rates of investment in higher 
education in the early part of  the 1970's were excessive.     But because 
of more recent labor market conditions discussed in this paper,   it 
seems  that  the present levels of public support for the four- 
year and higher degrees may be in excess  of what  the public sectot could 
invest and receive approximately the same benefit. 
Chapters  III and IV are aimed at appraising some work from 
distinguished  sources which have chosen to address themselves to 
the widespread forecasts of oversupplies of high level training. 
While the perspectives of  these works as well as the perspective of this 
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paper are decidely pro-education,   this paper is significantly in 
disagreement with  the reasoning and the policy prescriptions  of the 
Carnegie Commission and the National Board of Graduate Education. 
Evaluating these conventional policy sources and suggesting alternative 
approaches have also been part of  this paper's objective. 
Points  on which this paper agrees with the Carnegie Commission 
and the National Board on Graduate Education include the specific 
call for more  and better quality information availability in the market 
decisions  to invest in higher education.     Likewise,   there is to be 
no quarrel with the Carnegie Commission and the National Board of 
Graduate Education's  general attitudes toward the important role which 
higher education plays in the determination of  the overall welfare of 
the nation.     In noting the difficulty in proving the existence, much 
less the quantification of the social benefits to higher education 
this paper,   like the Carnegie Commission report and the National 
Board on Graduate Education paper,   recognizes the need to proceed with 
future educational policies  in a manner mindful of these important 
though clouded decision variables.     However,   it is  felt here that the 
Carnegie Commission and the National Board on Graduate Education over- 
emphasize  the degree  to which such a recognition of social benefits  to 
higher education should affect policy.    These sources  consequently 
forego a more analytical approach to evaluating the current situation 
for higher education. 
The Carnegie Commission and the N.B.G.E.   reports seem to be 
based on the premise  that  given the esteem which education has always 
enjoyed,  more education is always preferable to less.     This approach 
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effectively  ignores  costs and leaves analysis of higher education 
support  to subjective terms.     As shown in the second and fourth 
chapters,   it is not as if some relatively simple analysis  is incapable 
of providing a superior means of viewing the relationships between 
public benefits versus publically borne costs and private benefits 
versus privately borne costs.     The information called for by the 
Carnegie Commission and the National Board on Graduate Education 
would in fact permit such an improved evaluation of public policy 
toward higher education. 
The  figures  forecast  for underemployment of the college educated 
strongly indicate  that future financial support for such higher 
education should reflect greater emphasis on the cheaper alternatives 
in less  than four-year degree programs with more of an occupational 
orientation.     This   type of future policy does not disregard nor does 
it underemphasize  the non-market benefits to the higher levels of 
post-secondary education.     Rather,  removing some public subsidy 
from four-year programs would equitably shift more of   the cost 
burden to  individual students who are the recipients of the non- 
market benefits. 
The evidence which Whindham and others have shown suggests 
that some higher educational subsidy arrangements,   in fact,   favor 
the offspring of higher income classes.«    In line with this evidence 
of an adverse income redistribution through higher educational support, 
the motive  to  alter  the public support structure for such training 
is further enhanced.     More of the burden of four-year education should 
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be shifted to  the private investor.     The relatively greater magnitude 
of privately  realized benefits  to four-year higher education make 
this policy desirable. 
There are  two ways in which students will likely realize more 
of the educational burden in the future.    First,  monetary 
costs in tuitions  and fees can be raised somewhat to bring private costs 
more in line with private benefits.     Raising private costs will likely 
diminish the number of admissions which students demand.    As a 
result of  this  diminished demand,   educational output capacity can 
be reduced.     As educational output  capacity is lessened students will 
realize greater psychic  costs  to college admission as entrance standrads 
for the higher programs  are raised.     Certainly public expenditures 
on higher education can be reduced if excess four-year higher 
educational capacity  is   liquidated or converted to other uses.     The 
preferable public policy is then to reduce output  capacity somewhat 
and to raise  costs  somewhat. 
Reduction of educational output  capacity reduces public costs. 
This policy means  in some cases allowing institutions to alter their 
offerings   to accomodate  the new trends of the market in vocational 
and remedial courses  and  to allow marginal schools to go out of 
existence altogether.     As enrollments decline because of demographic 
changes and because of rising tuition costs it is likely that many 
institutions will  fall below efficient rates of utilization.    As 
this happens,   there is no economically feasible choice but to allow 
some to go out of business. 
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Should the proponents of public support for private colleges 
and universities become more successful,   the market  transition to 
accomodate slackened enrollment in private schools will be extended. 
This prolonged agony will be the case regardless of the equity argument 
in favor of  such subsidies;   and aside from the political furor 
surrounding the inevitiable decisions on which schools to drop and 
which to downgrade  to accomodate less prestigious types of training. 
Concerning  the conversion of the four-year education industry 
to the new market   trends,   it would be foolish to expect that  this 
will be a smooth process.     The well-established and prestigious 
college and university community will undoubtedly guard its vested 
interests by claiming the continuing need to subsidize higher education. 
In the aura which Americans hold for higher education,   administrators 
of colleges will vigorously  fight moves to adjust,  and the 
Carnegie Commission and the National Board of Graduate Education have 
set impressive precedents  for this administrative resistance.    What 
must be recognized,  however,   is  that   the preservation of superfluous 
educational capacity is   the equivalent of a featherbedding type of 
economic inefficiency and  is  contrary  to the public interest. 
As  evidence of   the benefits  to higher education,   the proponents 
of continued high level support for the bachelor's and higher degree 
levels have traditionally cited the earnings of the owners of this 
human capital.     It must be recognized,   however,   that the superior 
incomes and suspected superior contributions  to society are 
correlated with  their superior natural talents which would likely allow 
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these individuals  to earn greater incomes and provide greater 
contributions even without  the extra  training.     As well,   the superior 
incomes of   the highly educated are private returns to investments 
in this training and  these returns are only calculated on privately 
borne costs.     If   the  subsidies  to education are reduced in line with 
the recommendation of  this paper,   the return on investment  from the 
individual's  standpoint will be lower.     But in any event these earnings, 
as private benefits,   are not justifications for public subsidy. 
As private  costs  to education rise and as admission standards 
are increased,   otherwise marginally produced students will be 
discouraged  from four-year college attendance.     Since this group 
would have become underemployed anyway,   they will be no worse off 
occupational^ for having saved the costs of their four-year degree. 
In a non-market sense, however,   these individuals will not realize 
the personal benefits to such education unless  they continue  their 
education in a part  time or continuing education program. 
The public sector on the other hand will be no worse off  for 
having saved   the subsidy which would have gone to the marginally 
produced  student's  education.     Adequate job  training would be provided 
at less  cost  and the  individual would be free  to pursue the non- 
market aspects on his own if he wishes.     In any case,   there is no 
reason for private  investments in higher education to fall to 
socially undesirable levels as a result of increased costs.     Private 
investments will,   however,   fall to levels which more appropriately 
reflect the relative  costs  of  the various levels of higher education 
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and will in so doing serve to better allocate educational resources 
and to promote social welfare. 
The amount of  resources which have been channeled into the 
public's subsidization of  our-year and higher educational programs 
has been excessive in the sense that recent employment  trends show 
promise for substantial underemployment of  the human capital of those 
with four or more years of education.     The analysis of this paper 
would call for recognition of the fact  that while four-year degrees 
will be produced  in surplus,  the levels of output by institution pro- 
viding training in technical and vocational programs, adult education 
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and retraining programs are forecast as shortages. Greater public 
emphasis placed on providing for lower levels of post-secondary 
training such as provided in two-year and technical programs will 
likely hasten students*   recognition of  the career advantages which 
these programs offer.     For the present,   raising the cost of a four- 
year education would yield a beneficial effect by encouraging students 
to make more  informed and more realistic choices for occupational 
training. 
As a final recommendation,   this paper calls  for a continuing 
evaluation of   the present training-occupation situation.     That is, 
the circumstances which have  contributed to present wastes of educa- 
tional resources  indicate the economic danger in following trends 
for too long a  time.     The job market for the highly educated of the 
'50'a and   '60's has   changed and this,  among other things,   is an 
example of  the  effects of diminishing returns to investments in 
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education.     College level output capacity has been erroneously 
expanded as  if   there were insatiable demands  for college training. 
In line with this  lesson,   the  changes which the future holds would 
indicate a caveat  for educational policy makers to make responsible 
appraisals  of   changing market  demands and to make this information 
more available to potential investors in education.     Economic 
growth,   changes   in national programs or scientific research commitments, 
and technological advancements will always be capable of altering 
the complexion of our national  training needs.     In this  regard, 
we must not over-react  and allow the educational output capacity 
at any level to  fall  too  low.     As the catalyst for market flexibility 
and the soundingboard  for technology,   the human capital of an economic 
process  is  too  important a productive input to allow it to become 
subject  to misguided reactionary sentiments. 
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